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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In Scotland, there are no restrictions on how much land a single individual can own, and a 
concentrated pattern of large-scale private land ownership exists, particularly in rural areas.   
The Scottish Government has made it clear that it believes there is a need for change, 
stating that its vision is for a fairer – or wider and more equitable – distribution of land in 
Scotland, where communities and individuals have access to land and there is greater 
diversity of land ownership. This study was commissioned to enable the Scottish Land 
Commission to learn from international experience of imposing limits on who can own land 
and/or how much land any single individual or entity can own. 
 
The research identified and described restrictions on land ownership in 22 countries (18 in 
the EU/EEA). The countries were selected using a set of criteria to ensure lessons were 
learned from countries with a similar legislative context and characterised by strong 
regulation, governance and transaction processes, low levels of perceived corruption, and a 
strong property rights regime. Desk-based research identified the range of interventions in 
the countries, and findings were cross-checked with country experts to ensure accuracy. 
 
Interventions in the countries include restrictions that relate to: foreign ownership of land; 
ownership approval processes; upper and lower area limits; owner characteristics and land 
use requirements; pre-emptive rights to buy land; and measures to reduce land 
fragmentation. A range of motivations underpin the implementation of interventions to 
achieve policy objectives related to land ownership in the various countries.  Analysis of the 
motivations and the interventions allowed countries to be grouped according to the following 
typology, which identifies ‘foreign interest limiters’, ‘land use stipulators’ and ‘land 
consolidators’: 
 
 
 
 
In 18 of the countries considered in the study, some form of approval exists in relation to 
who can own land. Twelve countries require foreign land acquisitions to be approved prior to 
completion; processes of this nature exist to check the public interest impacts related to land 
purchase by a non-citizen. Approval processes are not limited to land acquisitions by 
foreigners: six countries require the relevant authority to approve all purchases of agricultural 
land. Underlying concerns tend to include: the local residence of the land owner; protection 
of agriculture; and the avoidance of land fragmentation. A formal approval process related to 
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the purchase of land or property does not exist in Scotland. Based on the experience in 
other countries, developing such a framework would not be unusual and may present an 
opportunity to consolidate what is in the public interest, in terms of who can own land. 
 
While the ownership of land by foreign interests is subject to regulatory restrictions in nine of 
the countries, outright bans on foreign ownership are not common (and EU law prevents EU 
Member States from restricting land purchases by EU citizens). Policy objectives associated 
with such restrictions generally include: preventing foreign-based speculation in land; 
controlling the amount and direction of direct foreign investment; ensuring local control over 
food production; and indirectly controlling immigration. In Scotland, motivations to restrict 
foreign ownership of large land parcels may be linked to the negative implications of a 
foreign land owner not being resident on the land, with purchases predominantly for 
recreational and/or speculative purposes. Where similar concerns have been raised in other 
countries, approval processes exist to restrict land purchases (regardless of the origin of the 
purchaser) that may lead to these concerns becoming a reality. 
 
In the countries studied, the implementation of restrictions on land ownership was more 
commonly driven by land speculation than by the intention to limit concentration of 
ownership. Only a few examples were identified of upper limits to the amount of land that 
any one individual or entity can own. Where such limits exist, they tend to be targeted at 
foreign land acquisitions and/or used as planning control mechanisms, rather than being 
used to restrict ownership rights or as mechanisms for redistribution.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research objective 
This research was commissioned by the Scottish Land Commission to identify and describe 
the various approaches that other countries have taken to limit who can own land and/or 
how much land any single individual or entity is permitted to own. The research will be used 
by the Commission to inform future discussions about how the diversity of land ownership 
could be increased in Scotland. 
 
1.2 Land ownership concentration in Scotland 
Land reform in Scotland is rooted in an approach that emphasises sustainable development, 
human rights and public interest: the Scottish Government has a ‘vision of a Scotland where 
the ownership, management and use of land and buildings contributes to the collective 
benefit of everybody1’. Principle 2 of the Land Rights and Responsibilities Statement (LRRS: 
Scottish Government, 2017), states that ‘there should be a more diverse pattern of land 
ownership and tenure, with more opportunities for citizens to own, lease and have access to 
land’. There are currently no specific restrictions on who can own land or how much land a 
single individual or entity can own. 
 
A central topic of discussion related to land reform and Principle 2 of the LRRS continues to 
be the concentrated pattern of private land ownership in rural Scotland, particularly the well-
documented observation that ‘a relatively small number of land owners with large properties 
own the majority of Scotland’s land area’ (LRRG 2014, p.159). Despite an expansion of 
public land ownership in rural Scotland during the first half of the 20th century and the growth 
of owner-occupied farms in some lowland areas, private ownership of large properties 
continues to dominate2. In 2014, 1,125 ‘estates3’ were estimated to control about 70% (4.1 
million hectares) of privately-owned rural land, with 667 estates between 1,000 and 10,000 
hectares in size and 87 larger than 10,000 hectares (Hindle et al., 2014, p.29). There is also 
a relatively high degree of intergenerational continuity amongst the owners of large estates 
and a strong preference among owners, regardless of whether they had inherited or 
purchased their estates, to pass them on to heirs (McKee et al., 2013). This is the case 
whether they are owners in their own right or as beneficiaries through companies and trusts 
(LRRG, 2014, p.177). Succession law in Scotland has generally allowed estates to stay 
intact without division on the death of a land owner. This would suggest that the long-term 
pattern of low turnover in the estate land market is ‘unlikely to change in the foreseeable 
future’ (Thomson et al., 2016, p.19). 
 
Scottish land and assets have increasingly been bought and sold by owners who are not 
resident. Absenteeism, where the estate is not the owner’s primary residence, is 
predominantly for recreational and/or investment purposes (MacMillan et al., 2010) and most 
absentees have not been resident land owners previously (McKee et al, 2013). Non-
economic motivations (particularly recreation) can outweigh economic reasons for 
purchasing land (Petrzelka et al., 2013) and owners typically subsidise their estates from 
earnings made elsewhere. Foreign ownership is common and there is no regulation of 
foreign investment in UK real estate: a quarter of rural estates sold in 2016 were purchased 
by overseas buyers (Strutt and Parker, 2017).  
 
                                               
1
 Scottish Land Commission website (2018). 
2
 For a detailed overview of historical trends in the pattern of rural land ownership in Scotland, see Section 24 of 
the Land Reform Review Group report (2014, pp. 159-164) and Thomson et al. (2016, pp. 19-22) for more detail 
about land ownership churn, land settlement and ownership trends during the last century. 
3
 Hindle et al. (2014) define an ‘estate’ as ‘landholdings with a range of interests that may include in hand 
farming, let farms, sporting interests, forestry, residential property, workspaces, tourism and community facilities’ 
(p.14). 
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The lack of traceability and accountability of some legal bodies, based overseas, that own 
land in Scotland are now common concerns related to tax fraud and tax evasion. In 
examining issues related to ‘modernisation and reform’ of land ownership, the LRRG 
considered ‘the limited constraints on the types of legal bodies that can own land in 
Scotland’, recommending that it be made ‘incompetent for any legal entity not registered in a 
member state of the European Union to register title to land in the Land Register of Scotland, 
to improve traceability and accountability in the public interest’ (LRRG, 2014, p.36). This 
recommendation did not find legislative form in the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016. 
Instead, following a recent consultation on improving transparency in land ownership in 
Scotland, the Scottish Government has resolved to develop regulations to deliver a register 
of controlling interests4, which will build on the framework provided for in Part 3 of the Land 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2016. Recent research of archive material has revealed an earlier 
attempt to require landowning entities to disclose any ultimate beneficial ownership data was 
almost legislated for by the UK Parliament but the relevant drafting was removed from what 
became the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979 and the proposal was forgotten (Reid, 
2017).  
 
The LRRG also recommended that the Scottish Government develop proposals to establish 
a legal upper limit on the total amount of land in Scotland that can be held by a private land 
owner or single beneficial interest. It was noted by the LRRG that concern was ‘not what an 
upper limit should be, but the principle that there should be an established limit’ (Section 24 
para 27, p.167).  
 
1.3 Land ownership concentration elsewhere 
Whereas the feudal tenure system has not existed for centuries in most western European 
countries, it was not formally abolished in Scotland until the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2000. Other types of reforms (constitutional and legal, as well as political and 
social revolution in some cases) have led to changes in patterns of land ownership in 
Europe. This is notable, for example, in Denmark, France, Ireland and Italy, where 
landholdings have decreased in size and increased in number (Pollock, 2015).  
 
Land reform programmes exist in other countries, with ‘the purposes of the reforms defined 
to match the circumstances’ (LRRG, 2014, p.23). Prominent examples include: agrarian 
changes in Africa, Asia and Latin America since the 1950s, when land reform was made a 
condition of development aid by the United Nations (UN); and the restitution and privatisation 
of property in Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Hartvigsen, 
2013). In the former, the definition of land reform by the UN highlighted the importance of 
‘eliminat[ing] obstacles to economic and social development’ as a basis for reform5. In 
Eastern Europe, reforms were more closely aligned with the World Bank’s definition of land 
reform as ‘changing the institutional structure governing man’s relationship with the land’6.  
 
Since 1989, agriculture has undergone a remarkable transition in Central and Eastern 
European countries, from State farms or cooperatives to private farming in market 
economies (European Commission, 2017). In some of these countries, reforms have led to 
significant change in farm structures; in others, there has been little change (Hartvigsen, 
2014; Bański, 2017). A prominent concern in these countries is land fragmentation, rather 
than concentration. Fragmentation has negative impacts on the land market by increasing 
negotiation and information costs, in turn reducing farm performance (Loughrey et al., 2018). 
Land fragmentation concerns are, however, not limited to these countries: e.g. Denmark also 
has a high degree of land fragmentation.  
 
                                               
4
 Consultation responses analysis (2017). 
5
 UN Progress in Land Reform (1962 – cited in LRRG report). 
6
 World Bank, Land Reform Sector Policy (1975 – cited in LRRG report). 
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Concerns in EU Member States about land concentration and land speculation7 have 
recently gained a higher profile on the political agenda: in April 2017, the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution on the state of play of farmland concentration in the EU8. 
Ownership of agricultural land is becoming increasingly concentrated in Europe, with one per 
cent of agricultural businesses controlling 20% of agricultural land in the EU and three per 
cent controlling 50%. Conversely, 80% of agricultural businesses control only 14.5% of 
agricultural land (European Economic and Social Committee, 2015). Large-scale land deals 
contribute to increasing land concentration (Loughrey et al., 2016), with impacts on human 
rights and the right to adequate food in farming communities and rural society (Franco and 
Borras Jr., 2013).  
 
Concerns around foreign investments in agricultural land are not new, but a recent rise in 
foreign investment in farmland has been noted in some Member States. Political debate 
about foreign investment relates mainly to the potential limits on access to land for local 
farmers, as well as the notion that that cultivable land has become vulnerable to speculators 
or unscrupulous investors (European Commission, 2017). Other concerns about land 
concentration and speculation tend to relate to the negative impacts on food security, 
employment, the environment, soil quality and rural development (Heubuch, 2016). 
 
1.4 Interventions in land markets to limit land ownership 
Most Western European countries do not have an explicit, overarching national land policy, 
with statements similar to the Scottish LRRS included in national constitutions and backed 
up by specific land laws (Pollock, 2015). While there are some common structures in the 
different legal systems governing land and property in European countries, national systems 
have their own unique characteristics related to land registration, land law and interests in 
land, sale of land and enforcement procedures (Schmid et al., 2005).  
 
National land laws in EU Member States have various objectives, from keeping farmland in 
agricultural use to curbing land concentration, with a common objective of avoiding 
excessive land speculation (European Commission, 2017). Laws related to expropriation 
(compulsory purchase) of land exist in all States, to make land available to complete planned 
public projects (Hoops, 2017). In some countries, pre-emption rights allow an individual or 
the State to intervene directly for agricultural or housing policy purposes (Hengstermann and 
Hartmann, 2018). EU law allows restrictions on foreign investments in farmland, to protect 
legitimate public interests such as preventing land speculation, preserve agricultural 
communities or sustain and develop viable agriculture (European Commission, 2017). 
 
EU Member States differ in their regulation of agricultural land markets: some countries have 
a high regulation index for both rental and sales markets (e.g. France); others have highly 
regulated rental markets but not sales markets (e.g. Belgium, Netherlands); the UK is one of 
a group of countries with very little regulation in either rental or sales markets (including the 
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany and Ireland) (Swinnen et al., 2013). The range of 
interventions applied internationally to agricultural land markets is varied and includes 
measures to: protect the tenant; protect the (local) owner-cultivator; protect the owner; and 
prevent fragmentation (Swinnen et al., 2013). In practice, policy instruments include, for 
example, restrictions on nationality of owners; restrictions on owners (e.g. residency, 
qualifications); maximum area owned; land consolidation; maximum sale price; 
maximum/minimum rent; maximum/minimum lease duration; continuity of tenure; land-
specific court or other body for dispute resolution; rights to buy (e.g. tenant pre-emptive, 
tenant absolute, neighbour’s pre-emptive); tax breaks on transfers, ownership and/or rental 
income; new entrant tenure support, finance and/or partnerships; and other non-tenure 
                                               
7
 Purchasing real estate with the hope that the price will increase. 
8
 European Parliament Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, 30 March 2017. 
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legislation (e.g. planning, environment) (see Thomson et al., 2014 for a review of these 
tenure control measures in selected countries). 
 
The imposition of limits on maximum size of land holding is often driven by political views on 
social justice that prevail in the jurisdiction in question. The Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance 
of Tenure include the provision that ‘States may consider land ceilings as a policy option in 
the context of implementing redistributive reforms’ (FAO, 2012, p.25); these guidelines are 
supported by, amongst others, the G20 group of states including the UK (LRRG, 2014). A 
survey of 31 jurisdictions in Europe and North America in 2003 found that very few countries 
impose limits on maximum size of landholding, despite the issue being evident and the 
subject of debate (UNECE, 2003). Where they exist, property size restrictions tend to apply 
to agricultural land. Maximum or minimum sizes for other land or property that can be held in 
single ownership are usually established by local or regional authorities as part of planning 
control mechanisms, and often not perceived as restrictions of ownership rights or 
mechanisms for land redistribution.  
 
In some countries, land fragmentation is an issue because of fast and sometimes 
unbalanced land property distribution; in others it has been slowly progressing over centuries 
of unrestricted transactions on the land market (UNECE, 2003). EU rural development 
policies and FAO activities include land consolidation among the dominant measures in their 
integrated rural development programmes, aiming to reduce land fragmentation and 
minimise the disparities between rural and urban areas (Demetriou et al., 2012). Formal land 
consolidation schemes are common in Europe and generally involve a comprehensive 
reallocation procedure of fragmented agricultural or forest holdings (Vitikainen, 2004). 
 
1.5 Current interventions in Scotland 
The closest things to interventions to restrict land ownership in Scotland are priorities 
conferred on certain individuals or groups that can have the effect of usurping the plans of 
existing owners, as follows: 
 
 Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 – the pre-emptive right of an agricultural 
tenant to buy the land that they lease. This legislation introduced a regime for a 
tenant to register an interest in acquiring the land comprised in his/her lease contract 
and if the landowner intends to transfer the land, the landowner must notify the 
tenant and must not enter sale negotiations until s/he has dealt with the tenant’s 
interest. The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 has legislated to remove the need for 
the tenant to register an interest to establish this right and also introduces a right to 
force a sale when a landowner is in material breach of an obligation to a tenant, 
where that breach has been recognised by the Scottish Land Court or at arbitration. 
These reforms are not yet in force. 
 Crofters (Scotland) Act 1993 – this right, which was first introduced in 1976, allows 
crofting tenants to acquire the landlord’s interest in a compulsory sale. 
 Miscellaneous other tenant rights of acquisition. For example, tenants-at-will, an 
idiosyncratic landholding arrangement found in certain parts of Scotland, also have a 
right to buy under the Land Registration Act 1979. Previously, tenants in social 
housing also had a right to acquire title to the house they rented, but this has been 
suspended across the whole of Scotland. 
 Community rights to buy, in the form of: a pre-emptive right to acquire land targeted 
by a registered community interest (Part 2 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003); 
and a right for crofting communities to force a sale of certain croft land, common 
grazings and eligible additional land (Part 3 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003). 
Further rights are due to be introduced for communities to buy wholly or mainly 
neglected or abandoned land or environmentally mismanaged land (Part 3A of the 
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Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003) and for communities or a community nominee to 
buy land in a situation where the owner of that land is a barrier to sustainable 
development and certain other conditions are met (Part 5 of the Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2016). 
 
Special mention should also be given to the rural housing burden, a Scottish creation found 
in the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. This affords a right of pre-emption to recognised 
rural housing bodies, which runs with the land (that is to say, binds future owners) to the 
effect that a degree of control can be maintained by such bodies. Also of indirect relevance 
here are title conditions that can operate to confer a pre-emption on a neighbour (the 
benefited proprietor) when another neighbour sells land (the burdened proprietor), provided 
there is appropriate publicity of that pre-emption in both titles. The feudal system of land 
tenure also allowed for pre-emption rights in favour of feudal superiors, but these were 
abolished by the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000. Other title conditions 
can operate to limit owner autonomy in specific situations, but not normally in a way that 
affects juridical acts such as sale or lease of property. This is because burdens of that nature 
would be classed as being ‘repugnant with ownership’. 
 
For completeness, it can be noted that Scotland is not an exception to the general statement 
above that laws relating to expropriation (compulsory purchase) of land exist in all States. 
These can be used to allow a local authority to acquire land for a public project, such as a 
transport link or for developments linked to a major event like the 2014 Commonwealth 
Games in Glasgow. No analysis of these powers will be made here. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
This research employed a rigorous methodology to identify and describe the various 
approaches that other countries have taken to limit who can own land and/or how much land 
any single individual or entity is permitted to own. In the first instance, a ‘longlist’ of 22 
countries with current land market interventions related to ownership restrictions was 
developed. These countries were then filtered to a ‘shortlist’ of six countries that were 
considered in more depth. This section explains the two-stage selection process and the 
subsequent data collection and analysis methods that were used. 
 
2.1 Longlist of countries with restrictions on land ownership 
Countries were selected for study in an objective manner, rather than being selected solely 
based on the current knowledge of the research team and/or informed opinions regarding 
their applicability to the Scottish context. A ‘longlist’ of countries with land market 
interventions related to ownership restrictions was developed, with the aim of providing a 
wide-reaching, global understanding of the full range of interventions that exist in relevant 
countries. A list of global jurisdictions was used as a starting point and organised into four 
categories: 
 
1.  European Economic Area (EEA): the research brief anticipated that the main focus of 
the study be on experience from elsewhere in Europe (30 countries); 
2. Jurisdictions outside the EEA with similar legal systems to Scotland: a combination of 
civil and common law (16 countries, Louisiana, Puerto Rico, and Québec); 
3. Jurisdictions outside the EEA with similar legal systems to the rest of the UK: 
common law (31 countries, including the remainder of USA and Canada); 
4. Rest of the world: those with a different legal system and not fitting into the 
categories listed above. 
 
Jurisdictions falling into categories 1-3 were subjected to three additional filters that would 
allow lessons to be learned from countries characterised by strong regulation, governance 
and transaction processes, low levels of perceived corruption, and a strong property rights 
regime (jurisdictions in the fourth category were disregarded due to the different legislative 
contexts). Countries remained on the list if they received: 
 
1. ‘High transparency’ or ‘Transparent’ score on the 2016 Global Real Estate 
Transparency Index (GRETI9); and 
2. A score of greater than 50 on the latest Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index (201610); and 
3. A score of greater than 5 on the 2017 International Property Rights Index (IPRI11). 
 
The following 22 countries comprised the resulting ‘longlist’ of countries12: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA. Annex 1 explains the filters in more detail and shows 
the scores received for each filter in the longlist countries.  
 
2.1.1 Identification of interventions 
A desk-based review was carried out to identify and describe current land market 
interventions related to ownership restrictions in the longlist countries. A range of sources 
                                               
9
 jll.com/GRETI  
10
 transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016  
11
 internationalpropertyrightsindex.org  
12
 Hong Kong and Ireland also satisfied the selection criteria but were later removed from the list as no current 
land market interventions relate to who can own land and how much they can own. 
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was used: academic books and journal articles; published government and other reports; 
websites of relevant public agencies; and media articles. Similar data were gathered for all 
countries, including descriptions of current interventions and what/where/who they apply to, 
the motivation(s) that led to the interventions and the legal basis of interventions. It was also 
noted which countries have a cadastral land register, who holds the register, and what 
percentage of the land mass is registered.  
 
The constitutional protection of property rights of each country was examined to ascertain 
whether it has a dedicated legal instrument protecting property rights, e.g. Article 1 of the 
First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, or the ‘Takings clause’ in the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the USA13. Socio-economic and environmental data 
were also collected to characterise the human and physical geography of each country: 
population density; GDP per capita; % rural population; % of land under agricultural 
holdings; % of land under forest cover.  
 
2.1.2 Categorising countries and interventions 
A short summary of the relevant interventions was compiled for each country, accompanied 
by a description of the predominant motivations (or other socio-economic factors) that led to 
their implementation. Where possible, each short summary was checked for accuracy with 
one or more academic or government contacts in the respective country (see Annex 2). 
 
The summaries were then used to develop a typology of land market interventions and 
associated motivations, enabling countries to be categorised into three groups for further 
analysis (‘Foreign interest limiters’, ‘Land use stipulators’, ‘Land consolidators’). The form 
and content of the typology are presented and discussed in Section 3.2. 
 
2.2 Shortlist of countries with restrictions on land ownership 
The typology of land market interventions was used to select a smaller group of countries 
with good ‘spread’ across the typology categories and the types of interventions (and 
interventions for agricultural and non-agricultural land). Consideration was also given to 
geographical characteristics, in order to learn from a range of contexts: population density, 
% rural population, % land under agricultural holdings and % land under forest cover (after 
ensuring an even spread of interventions). These countries were then studied in more detail 
to understand the impacts of the interventions.  
 
As Scotland must frame its interventions to comply with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, countries without similar constitutional (or 
constitution-like) protection of property were not included in the shortlist. This was the case 
for Canada, New Zealand and Singapore (see Annex 3). Longlist countries without a robust 
land registration system with complete or near-complete coverage of the whole landmass 
were also excluded from the shortlist, as the public provision of land information in a way 
that is broadly accessible, comprehensive, reliable and current is an indicator of ‘good land 
governance’ and secure land rights as defined within the World Bank Land Governance 
Assessment Framework (Deininger et al., 2012). Canada, Portugal and Spain do not have 
robust registration systems according to this definition (systems in Australia and Poland are 
currently undergoing reform).  
 
Following the application of these criteria, the following countries were selected for the 
shortlist:  
 Australia, Switzerland (‘Foreign interest limiters’); 
 Germany, Norway, Poland (‘Land use stipulators’); 
                                               
13
 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that private property shall not be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
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 Slovakia (‘Land consolidators’). 
 
2.2.1 In-depth descriptions and analysis of impacts 
A case study template sheet was completed for each shortlisted country. In-depth 
descriptions of the interventions included information about: 
 
 When and why the intervention(s) were established; 
 Any socio-economic trends that influenced establishment of the intervention(s); 
 Thresholds/trigger points at which the intervention(s) come into effect (and why); 
 Structures/incentives put in place to implement and monitor arrangements; 
 Approval process(es) required to purchase land and efficiency of such process(es); 
 Success of the intervention(s) in achieving stated objectives; 
 Any unintended impacts (positive and/or negative); 
 Effects of the intervention(s) on land prices and availability of land; 
 Effects of the intervention(s) on the overall pattern of land ownership; 
 The level of political acceptance of the intervention(s). 
 
Legislation relevant to the intervention(s) was also noted, along with any other relevant 
information about legal issues that may have arisen. 
 
2.2.2 Cross-checking with country experts 
The accuracy of the information in the case study sheets was confirmed with academic 
and/or government contacts in each country to triangulate the data and to complete any 
parts that could not be completed via desk-based review. Questions were asked by 
phone/Skype or sent via email, accompanied by the completed case study sheet. Country 
contacts were identified via existing contacts held by the research team (and others that 
were subsequently suggested), via their contribution to documents already held on file, and 
via internet searches for involvement in relevant conferences, meetings, committees, etc. 
Annex 2 shows the contacts in the longlist and shortlist countries. 
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3. RESULTS 
The volume of material gathered for each of the countries on the longlist was substantial (for 
completeness, a country-specific, select reference list is in Annex 4). This section 
summarises this material to describe the different interventions found in the selected 
countries and presents the typology for categorising countries and interventions.  
 
3.1 Descriptions of interventions 
A range of restrictions on owning land are used in the selected countries to support the 
public interest and/or bring about a more equitable distribution of land. In general, current 
restrictions relate to: 
 
 Foreign ownership of land; 
 Ownership approval processes; 
 The maximum area of land in a single ownership; 
 Owner characteristics and land use requirements; 
 Pre-emptive rights to buy land; 
 Avoidance of land fragmentation. 
 
These restrictions are presented and described in the remainder of this section. Background 
information is provided to explain the types of measures used to deliver each intervention. 
Practical examples are then provided from the longlist countries and the motivations for 
implementing restrictions in these places are explained. A distinction can often be made 
between interventions that affect agricultural land and those that affect non-agricultural or all 
land. Where relevant and possible, this distinction is made in the data that follow.  
 
While this study focusses on measures relating directly to ownership of land, other 
restrictions (e.g. related to rental of land and property) are noted where they are relevant to 
understanding the motivations and/or impacts associated with measures focussed on 
ownership. It is beyond the scope of this project to consider the whole range of tenure 
interventions and other influences (e.g. taxation and planning restrictions). Other recent 
research (e.g. Swinnen et al., 2008; Ciaian et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2014); and ongoing 
research commissioned by the Scottish Land Commission considers these aspects in more 
detail. 
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3.1.1 Restrictions related to foreign ownership of land 
The ownership of land by foreign interests is subject to regulatory restrictions in many of the 
countries. Policy objectives associated with such restrictions generally include: preventing 
foreign-based speculation in land; controlling the amount and direction of direct foreign 
investment; ensuring local control over food production; and indirectly controlling 
immigration. Restrictions range from specific bans on foreign ownership of land to 
requirements that notice of foreign ownership be given to the relevant authority. The focus in 
this section is on those countries where foreigners are either not allowed to purchase land or 
certain limits exist.  
 
In European countries, ‘foreigners’ (often termed ‘third country nationals’) are defined as 
citizens of non-EU or EEA member states. The Treaty of Rome contains provisions14 which 
prohibit discrimination on the grounds of nationality, guaranteeing the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital within the EU. Combined, these provisions restrict the 
ability of Member States to limit land acquisition by citizens of other Member States. When 
new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, they 
were allowed to introduce transitory restrictions on agricultural land acquisitions by 
foreigners from EU Member States. These measures were to allow land markets to adjust 
gradually to competitive pressures from the single EU market, particularly the substantial 
differences in agricultural land prices. These transitory restrictions have now been revoked.  
 
Further afield, customary international law (that is to say, international law that is not derived 
from treaties) places no restriction on the right of states to restrict or regulate foreign 
ownership of land within their territories (Hodgson et al., 1999). States have sovereignty over 
their natural resource and are entitled to prevent the entry of foreigners or to allow them 
entry only on certain terms. Reciprocal agreements exist (i.e. foreign ownership is permitted 
when the jurisdiction of the foreigner grants reciprocal rights to nationals from the jurisdiction 
where land is purchased), as do trade agreement partnerships which allow similar mutual 
interest. An example of the latter would be Free Trade Agreements where rules on foreign 
ownership by nationals from countries in such agreements are different to those applied to 
foreign nationals from elsewhere. Table 1 shows current restrictions on ownership by foreign 
interests in the longlist countries.  
                                               
14
 Article 7 (discrimination on grounds of nationality); Article 8a (free movements of goods, persons, services, 
capital); Article 9 (nationals of Member States have equal employment rights and rights of accommodation in 
connection with their employment); Article 54 (enabling the national of one Member State to acquire and use land 
and buildings situated in the territory of another Member State).  
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Table 1: Restrictions on land and property ownership by foreign interests in the longlist 
countries 
Country Restriction on ownership by foreign interests 
Australia Foreign individuals are generally prohibited from purchasing 
established dwellings. 
Canada Maximum aggregate area limits for foreign interests in Alberta (20 
acres), Manitoba (40 acres), Prince Edward Island (5 acres), 
Saskatchewan (10 acres). 
Cyprus Non-EU citizens can own two properties (two residences, or one 
residence and one shop with floor area up to 100m2).  
Denmark All foreign individuals are generally restricted from buying residential 
property unless they have been resident in Denmark for more than five 
years. EU citizens/companies may be exempt if certain conditions are 
met (e.g. the property is a year-round residence). EU citizens working 
in Denmark are also exempt. Additional restrictions in some areas on 
all non-Danish citizens purchasing holiday homes. 
Iceland Residency requirements for board members of limited liability 
companies registered in Iceland wishing to own real property. 
New Zealand Foreign individuals, trusts and corporations are not allowed to 
purchase existing homes. 
Singapore Foreigners may not purchase a property with a land area greater than 
15,000 square feet. 
Switzerland Foreigners require a ‘Permit C’ (four years of permanent residence) to 
buy property in Switzerland. 
USA Acreage limitations on foreigners in some states. 
 
Restrictions on foreign persons wishing to buy existing properties exist in Australia and New 
Zealand. In Australia, this is to channel foreign investment into the construction of new 
dwellings, to create additional jobs in the construction industry and support economic 
growth. However, some foreign trusts and corporations can buy existing homes where staff 
need to be accommodated. In New Zealand, this is a very recent policy move in response to 
concerns about foreign buyers inflating the property market and high vacancy rates, with 
regulations also applying to foreign trusts and corporations. Recent socio-economic trends of 
strong immigration (19% increase in the last financial year15), low interest rates and limited 
housing supplies, particularly in areas affected by recent earthquakes, have driven the rise in 
house prices.  
 
In Denmark, a duty of residence is required before buying land (an EU national working in 
Denmark or other non-citizen may buy land without this requirement if he/she has a valid 
residence or business permit). Proof of five years of residence in Denmark is required to 
satisfy the duty of residence requirement. There are also additional restrictions on foreigners 
wishing to purchase property in and around popular Danish coastal areas. Similarly, annual 
quotas exist in some Cantons in Switzerland to restrict the number of holiday homes 
purchased by foreigners, particularly in mountain areas (for more detail about Switzerland, 
see Section 4.1.2). Norway also imposes restrictions on second homes to ensure occupation 
of the property. 
 
                                               
15
 New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment: 2015/2016 Trends and Outlook. 
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In Canada, maximum area limits exist for land purchases by foreigners in four provinces due 
to concerns about corporate foreign interests (from the USA, historically, and China more 
recently) affecting rural communities by dominating local agricultural interests, with negative 
impacts on the availability of farmland for residents. Restrictions can differ for individuals and 
legal entities: in Saskatchewan, a non-Canadian individual can hold up to ten acres, 
whereas a non-Canadian owned entity can hold an interest in up to 320 acres of land if the 
majority of issued voting shares are legally or beneficially owned by Saskatchewan residents 
or agricultural corporations.  
 
A similar residency requirement applies in relation to limited liability companies registered in 
Iceland: if board members are not Icelandic nationals, they must have resided in Iceland 
continuously for at least five years before the company is allowed to lease or own real 
property. The amount of foreign direct investment is controlled in Singapore, where a 
maximum property area of 15,000 square feet exists for foreigners; and in Cyprus, where 
foreign investors can own a maximum of two properties. In the USA, upper area limits and 
other restrictions for foreigners buying agricultural land exist in Arizona, Iowa, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin16. 
 
3.1.2 Restrictions related to ownership approval 
Foreign investors are required to gain prior authorisation for owning land in 12 of the longlist 
countries. This is a common method to ensure restriction and regulation of foreign ownership 
and check the intentions of those seeking to buy land and property. Table 2 shows the 
approval processes applied to foreign investors in the longlist countries. 
 
Motivations for implementing approval processes are varied. In some countries, the approval 
process is designed to check the public benefit of foreign investment in land and property.  In 
New Zealand, the approval process administered by the Overseas Investment Office exists 
to check the public benefit associated with foreign investment in ‘sensitive land’. This term is 
generally used to describe non-urban land that exceeds five hectares, land located on 
specific islands, and land exceeding 0.4 hectares in an area that adjoins lakes, the foreshore 
and seabed, reserves, historic areas, and other listed features17. In Singapore, foreign 
investors require permanent residency for five years before being able to buy some types of 
property (generally larger apartments and houses). Applicants are required to prove their 
economic contribution to Singapore and, once purchased with the necessary permissions, 
the property cannot be sold again for five years. 
                                               
16
 Data from National Association of Realtors (2006). 
17
 Land Information New Zealand: Sensitive Land 
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Table 2: Examples of approval processes for foreigners purchasing land and property  
Country Foreign investment approval processes 
 General Specific to agricultural 
land 
Australia Required by all foreign persons before 
purchasing real estate and vacant residential 
land for development. 
Required where the person’s 
cumulative agricultural land holding 
exceeds A$15 million and for all 
acquisitions of agricultural land by 
foreign government investors. 
Austria Purchase of a holiday home by non-EU/EEA 
citizens requires mandatory approval from 
local authorities. 
 
Canada 
(Québec) 
 Permission required for non-Québec 
resident purchase of more than 10 
acres in a designated reserve area 
or south of the 50th parallel. 
Cyprus Non-EU citizens require permission from the 
Council of Ministers to acquire immovable 
property. 
 
Denmark All non-Danish individuals and legal entities 
must apply for permission from the Minister of 
Justice to acquire immovable property 
(residency exceptions apply). 
 
Finland (Åland 
Islands) 
Foreigners or Finns without local domicile 
require permission from the local 
administration to buy land. 
 
Iceland Non-EEA citizens must have domicile in 
Iceland and require permission from the 
relevant Minister to purchase property. 
 
New Zealand Foreigners require permission from the 
Overseas Investment Office to purchase 
sensitive land and high valued businesses. 
 
Poland Foreigners require a permit from the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, issued to those who can prove 
a connection to Poland e.g. temporary or 
permanent residence permit. 
 
Singapore Foreigners buying vacant residential land and 
some types of residences require approval 
from the Singapore Land Authority. 
 
Spain Acquisition of land by foreign governments 
requires approval by Spanish government. 
 
Switzerland Prior authorisation from the appropriate 
Cantonal authority (does not apply to 
businesses buying commercial property). 
 
 
The acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners requires specific approval in some 
countries. In Australia, approval is required for foreign investors whose cumulative 
agricultural land holding exceeds A$15 million, and for all acquisitions of agricultural land by 
foreign government investors. This is due to concerns about foreign buyers inflating the 
property market and affecting the access of Australians to farms. Exceptions to this rule 
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apply to investors from trade agreement partners (Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, 
USA) but not to purchases by the governments of these countries (for more detail about the 
situation in Australia, see Section 4.1.1).  
 
In the Åland Islands of Finland, foreigners or Finns without local domicile in the islands (with 
local connection linked to five years of continuous residence in the islands) require 
permission from the local administration to buy land, to protect the cultural and language 
heritage. Permission is normally granted for house purchase if the person is living 
permanently in Åland in a town or city, but not for farmland (to protect local agricultural 
interests). Purchasing a second home in the islands requires local domicile. Approval 
processes in Iceland exist to restrict the purchase of land in national parks. 
 
Approval processes do not apply solely to foreign investors. Table 3 lists countries with 
approval processes that apply to all purchases of certain types of land and/or property, 
whether by citizens or non-citizens. These approval processes generally apply to agricultural 
or forestry land, with underlying policy objectives of ensuring that this type of land does not 
become fragmented, allowing viable economic use of the land, and retaining land in 
families/communities to ensure the continuation of family farms. 
Table 3: Examples of approval processes for all purchasers in the longlist countries 
Country General approval processes  
Austria Acquisition of agricultural or forestry land 
requires approval by relevant federal agency. 
Czech Republic The sale of forests owned by state entities is 
approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Germany The sale of agricultural or forestry holdings 
greater than a certain size must be approved by 
the regulatory authority in the respective federal 
state. 
Iceland Transfer of agricultural land to individuals and 
legal entities must be approved by the local 
Council, the regional farming commission and 
the Ministry of Agriculture. This does not apply 
to sales to a close relative. 
Norway All sales of agricultural land of a certain size 
require a Concession Permit from the 
government (unless there is an exemption). 
Sweden Natural and legal purchasers of agricultural land 
in sparsely populated areas require a permit 
(based on employment impacts and/or 
residency on the property). An acquisition permit 
is required for buying forestry land. 
Switzerland A permit is required to buy agricultural land, with 
some exceptions. 
 
In Sweden, permission is required to purchase land in sparsely populated areas (as 
classified by the regional authorities). This is to ensure that local employment and 
populations are retained in remote places that might otherwise experience land 
abandonment and outmigration. Land acquisition applications are processed by County 
Administrative Boards in each region. Local residents are exempt from permit requirements, 
as are family members and those who inherit land. There are no exceptions for legal entities 
wishing to purchase land in these areas.  
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In Austria, approval from the relevant federal agency is required to buy agricultural or forest 
land. Although restrictions vary between the federal provinces, buyers must often be farmers 
or have adequate farming/forestry experience. New owners are also required to be resident 
fairly close to the plot being purchased. There are additional approval processes for non-
farmers (those who do not intend to cultivate the land themselves), who may be required to 
show proof of sufficient funds for managing the land appropriately.  
 
3.1.3 Restrictions related to the maximum area of land in a single ownership 
Limitations related to the maximum area of land held in private ownership provide a tool for 
preventing the excessive aggregation of land by an individual or entity. Restrictions related 
to the maximum area of land that can be held in a single ownership by foreigners have 
already been described in Section 3.1.1. The remainder of this section describes general 
approaches to limiting the maximum area of land in a single ownership, as applied to all 
persons/entities purchasing land in a specific country. 
 
This type of intervention is currently present in Poland where an individual farmer may only 
own up to 300 hectares of agricultural land, in order to prevent the concentration of land in 
large agricultural estates. A five-year ban has also been in place since 2016 on the purchase 
of state land, to protect agricultural land from speculative purchase by domestic and foreign 
buyers following the end of transitory restrictions implemented when Poland joined the EU 
(for more detail about the Polish situation, see Section 4.2.3). 
 
Until 2010, upper limits on land held in a single ownership existed in Denmark, to safeguard 
the existence of smaller, family-operated farms. A general maximum of 400 hectares across 
up to four properties was permitted per single owner. This restriction was removed under 
pressure from farm lobbying groups, who wanted more opportunities for economies of scale 
in agriculture, and to increase demand for farmland after Danish land values decreased 
following the global financial crisis in 2008. An upper limit of 150 hectares also related to the 
amount of additional agricultural land that could be acquired or leased via pre-emptive rights 
of neighbouring farmers; these rights were revoked in 2015. It should be noted that these 
upper limits were first established as a result of political preference for small farms. There 
continue to be limits on the distance of rented land from the main farm. 
 
3.1.4 Restrictions related to owner characteristics and land use requirements 
Several countries on the longlist impose restrictions on who can own agricultural land. These 
are generally related to farming experience and qualifications, residency and a commitment 
to carry out agricultural operations. These restrictions tend to exist to preserve agricultural or 
forestry family farms, increase productivity of small family farms, and keep farmland in 
agricultural use. There are some analogies here with the experience or qualification that is 
needed in Scotland before a new tenant can take an assignation of a secure agricultural 
lease from an existing tenant who is a near relative of the incoming tenant in a way that 
cannot be challenged by the landlord18. Separate but similar analogies can be drawn to 
crofting law which operates in parts of Scotland, where crofting tenants and owner-occupier 
crofters are subject to a residency duty and other duties (to not misuse or neglect the croft, 
and to cultivate the croft or put it to another purposeful use)19. Table 4 lists the countries that 
implement these types of restrictions.  
 
                                               
18
 Similar to Section 10A of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991, regarding assignations of 
existing secure 1991 Act tenancies to new incoming tenants. 
19
 Under sections 5AA, 5A and 5B (for crofting tenants) and section 19C (for owner-occupier crofters) 
of the Crofters (Scotland) Act 1993. 
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Residency requirements exist for purchasing agricultural land in Norway, Poland and 
Slovakia. In Norway, the authorities may demand that buyers of agricultural land live on the 
property for a minimum of five years. In Poland, buyers are required to have lived in a given 
locality for five years before purchase and to pledge to work the purchased land themselves 
for a decade. In Slovakia, where a preference order for buyers based on 
residency/experience is in operation, the priority buyer must have farmed for three years in a 
municipality to buy a plot there (for more detail about Slovakia, see Section 4.3.1). Proof of 
agricultural qualifications and/or farming experience is required in Austria, Iceland, Poland, 
and Slovakia. In Norway, preference is given to buyers whose stated occupation is farming 
(for more detail about Norway, see Section 4.2.2). 
Table 4: Examples of restrictions related to residency, qualifications of the purchaser and 
use of land in the longlist countries (note that all are related to agricultural land) 
Country Land use restrictions/qualifications 
Austria Purchasers of agricultural land must be farmers or 
have adequate qualifications/experience. New 
owners of agricultural land must have their 
residence close to the plot. 
Iceland Two years of practical farming experience required 
to purchase agricultural land. 
Norway Authorities can demand that buyers of agricultural 
land live on the property for a minimum of five 
years, with preference given to those whose stated 
occupation is farming. Land owners have 
responsibility to ensure land is actively farmed by 
themselves or a tenant farmer. 
Poland Farming qualification required to buy agricultural 
land and the law requires that the purchaser has 
lived in a given locality for five years and pledges 
to work the land for a decade. 
Slovakia The priority purchaser must have farmed for three 
years in the municipality in order to buy a plot in 
the same municipality. Other requirements related 
to preference order for buyers. 
Switzerland Comply with principle of ‘self-cultivation’ – the 
owner/tenant must be able to cultivate the land 
themselves. 
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3.1.5 Pre-emptive rights to buy land 
Measures that allow a right of first refusal (pre-emptive right) to purchase land and property 
can be characterised in two ways:  
 
1. Pre-emptive rights where a tenant has a priority right to buy land, either from their 
own landlord when offered for sale or when another parcel of land comes onto the 
market (these rights are normally associated with agricultural land in the longlist 
countries). 
2. Pre-emptive rights where the State may intervene and become land owner (these 
rights are normally associated with interventions to assist development in the longlist 
countries). 
 
While the latter (pre-emptive rights of the State) may not restrict directly who can own land, 
these rights may influence the decision to buy land in places that such rules apply. Table 5 
summarises the existence of pre-emptive rights in the longlist countries. Pre-emptive rights 
exist for agricultural tenants in France, Poland and Spain. These types of rights also exist in 
Belgium, Norway and Switzerland, but sales to relatives of the vendor are generally given 
priority over sales to the tenant. Pre-emptive rights exist for neighbouring agricultural 
tenants/owners in Poland, Portugal and Spain, to allow consolidation of plots and increase 
productivity of small family farms by acquiring additional land (within the upper area limits in 
Poland). 
 
Pre-emptive rights of the State (and its representatives) exist in France to control 
speculation within the farm land market when prices appear to exceed usual local farmland 
values. Private companies in charge of farmland management (Sociétés d’Aménagement 
Foncier et d’Equipement Rural – SAFERs) have rights of pre-emption under the French 
Rural Code to intervene in land sales and take temporary possession of land for reallocation, 
although these companies have not been as active in this regard as might have originally 
been expected. 
 
From a development perspective, pre-emption rights may also be used by local governments 
in France (les départements) to acquire ‘sensitive natural sites’, protect ‘peri-urban farmland 
and natural spaces’, or buy land for development or regeneration projects. For example, pre-
emption may be used to purchase commercial buildings to enable diversification of 
businesses within a neighbourhood. In Finland, municipalities also have a right of pre-
emption to purchase land that is needed for local community infrastructure or nature 
protection. In metropolitan areas (the municipalities of Helsinki, Espoo, Kauniainen and 
Vantaa), this pre-emptive right can be used for land purchases greater than 3000m2. Outside 
these areas, the limit is 5000m2. In the Netherlands, some municipalities have opted for an 
‘active land policy’, acquiring agricultural land and developing it before reselling it to 
developers, businesses, or individuals. 
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Table 5: Examples of pre-emptive rights to buy land in the longlist countries 
Country State pre-emptive rights Individual pre-emptive rights 
Belgium  Pre-emptive rights for agricultural 
tenants if the landlord sells (after 
priority to family member/business 
partner). 
Finland Municipal right of pre-emption for 
land purchase for local community 
infrastructure or nature protection.  
 
France The Government can pre-empt land 
acquisitions for housing policy 
purposes or building land reserves. 
Land Development and Rural 
Settlement Companies (SAFERs) 
have pre-emptive right to buy 
agricultural land.  
Housing and farm tenants have a 
pre-emptive right to acquire land or 
property when the owner plans a 
sale.  
Netherlands Some municipalities acquire 
agricultural land and develop it 
before reselling. 
 
Norway  Family members have preferred 
buyer status when agricultural 
properties are put up for sale. 
Poland The National Centre for Support of 
Agriculture has a pre-emptive right to 
buy agricultural land, intervening to 
cap excessive local price rises. 
Neighbouring farmers have a pre-
emptive right to buy agricultural 
land when it is for sale. A tenant 
who has rented private land for 
three years has a pre-emptive right 
to purchase it when it is for sale. 
Portugal  Neighbouring farmers have right of 
first refusal when a plot of 
agricultural land is sold. 
Spain  Agricultural tenants (if qualified as 
‘professional farmers’) have a pre-
emptive right to purchase land for 
sale. Land owners of prioritised 
agricultural holdings have a pre-
emptive right over adjoining 
holdings. 
Switzerland  Relatives have right of first refusal 
when an agricultural business is 
sold. Agricultural tenants also have 
a pre-emptive right, although 
relatives are given priority. 
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3.1.6 Measures to reduce land fragmentation 
While this research explores land ownership interventions in the context of addressing land 
concentration in Scotland, it is important to note measures to consolidate fragmented land, in 
order to understand the full range of land market interventions that limit who can own land 
and how much can be owned, and why these interventions have been applied. Land 
fragmentation is not a common issue in rural Scotland, although the sale of very small 
souvenir land plots continues, the titles for which cannot be registered in the Land Register 
as a result of provisions in the Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012 (Robbie and 
Combe, 2015). 
 
The negative impacts of land fragmentation on land market development are widely 
documented (e.g. Hartvigsen, 2014) and many countries have sought to constrain the 
subdivision of land and promote consolidation through formal consolidation schemes. The 
objectives of these schemes include: improving agricultural and forest land division, 
enlarging farm sizes, acquiring land for the state, readjusting development areas, improving 
infrastructure (e.g. road networks), and improving environmental infrastructure (e.g. 
drainage) (Vitikainen, 2004). As explained in the introduction, this type of intervention is 
particularly prevalent in Central and Eastern European countries, where land has been 
reallocated (or readjusted) in order to change farm structures, enhance local and national 
infrastructure, and enhance the land market.  
 
It is also important to note that pre-emptive rights often have an underlying aim of land 
consolidation and avoidance of fragmentation, for example in enabling land owners/tenants 
to acquire adjacent plots (as described in the previous section), as does inheritance law, 
which imposes restrictions on how land can be divided (or not) among heirs. Minimum area 
restrictions are an important tool for preventing land fragmentation: imposing limits on the 
growth of the number of small land holdings is usually intended to sustain the economic 
environment that would lead to the need for consolidation procedures if not regulated 
(UNECE, 2003). Minimum land parcel sizes exist in Cyprus, Slovakia, and some regions of 
Spain, to ensure that land does not become fragmented. Table 6 summarises measures to 
reduce land fragmentation in the longlist countries. 
Table 6: Examples of measures to reduce land fragmentation in the longlist countries 
Country Measures to reduce land fragmentation 
Austria Minimum sizes for forest parcels (usually approximately one 
hectare) 
Cyprus Minimum size regulations for parcels created after the 
implementation of land consolidation schemes. 
Czech Republic Abandoned estates can be transferred to state ownership after ten 
years. 
Norway Land that is used (or may be used) for agriculture or forestry may 
not be subdivided without consent of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Slovakia Land parcels may not be divided into plots smaller than 0.5 
hectares of forest land (except for in community forests) and 0.2 
hectares of agricultural land. 
Spain Minimum forest area in some regions; these properties cannot be 
split or sold in part. 
Sweden Regulations to avoid forestry fragmentation and incentives to 
promote merging of holdings into larger units. 
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3.2 Typology of land market interventions 
Figure 1 shows the typology of land market interventions to restrict ownership that was 
developed after the initial desk-based review and cross-checking with country experts of 
interventions in the longlist countries. The typology allows countries to be categorised into 
three groups, according to the motivations for interventions and the restrictions applied. The 
three groups are:  
 
 Foreign interest limiters; 
 Land use stipulators; and 
 Land consolidators. 
 
Annex 5 shows the interventions in the longlist countries, organised into the three categories 
and the remainder of this section explains each category and the dominant motivations and 
intervention(s) in each country. Shortlisted countries are highlighted in bold. 
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Figure 1: Typology of relevant land market interventions in the longlist countries to restrict ownership 
Countries on the longlist fall into three groups: foreign interest limiters; land use stipulators and land consolidators. These groupings are based 
on the motivations for interventions and the restrictions in place (see Annex 5 for accompanying data). 
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Foreign interest limiters are characterised by dominant policy objectives that relate to 
making land available for local interests. In practice, this includes objectives to: maintain a 
resident population; make property more affordable by restricting foreign investment; prevent 
land banking by foreign investors; keep farmland available for citizens; restrict purchase of 
agricultural land by foreign corporations; ensure state security; and control levels of foreign 
investment. The countries in this group are shown in Table 7.  
 
The interventions applied to deliver these objectives tend to include one or more of: 
 
1. Upper area limits for foreigners/non-residents; 
2. Approval processes for purchase by foreigners; 
3. Other general restrictions for foreigners/non-residents. 
Table 7: Foreign interest limiters - policy objective and interventions 
Country Dominant policy objective Dominant intervention(s) 
  Upper area 
limits 
(foreigners) 
Approval 
process 
(foreigners) 
Other 
restrictions 
on foreigners 
Australia Protection of established 
population 
 X X 
Canada* Farmland availability for residents X X  
Denmark Protection of those with residence  X X 
Iceland Keep farmland in agricultural use   X X 
New Zealand Make property more affordable for 
citizens 
 X X 
Singapore Control foreign investment in land 
market 
X X  
Switzerland Keep/make land available for 
citizens 
 X X 
USA** Farmland availability for residents X  X 
*Alberta, Québec, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan. 
**Applies to certain states. 
 
Land use stipulators are characterised by dominant policy objectives that relate to 
developing optimum conditions for economic, environmental and/or social development. In 
practice, this includes objectives to: limit land speculation; protect environmental and cultural 
heritage; maintain agricultural/forestry land uses; develop community infrastructure; and 
support new/young farmers.  State security can also be a motivating factor in this category, 
related to pre-emptive rights of the state to acquire strategic land (Finland). Reducing or 
avoiding land concentration is a motivating factor in this group, although generally not the 
dominant policy objective (see 
 
 
Table 8).  
 
The interventions applied to deliver these objectives tend to include one or more of: 
 
1. Restrictions related to the use of land (e.g. residence, education); 
2. General approval processes for land purchase; 
3. Upper area limits for all purchasers; 
4. Pre-emptive rights of public authorities to buy land. 
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Table 8: Land use stipulators - policy objective and interventions 
Country Dominant policy objective Dominant intervention(s) 
  Restrictions 
on land use 
Approval 
process 
(general) 
Upper 
area limits 
(for all) 
Pre-emptive 
rights (public 
authorities) 
Austria Preserve and improve family 
farms 
X    
Finland State security    X 
France Control land speculation    X 
Germany Market transparency to avoid 
land speculation 
 X   
Netherlands Market transparency    X 
Norway Keep farmland in agricultural 
use 
X X   
Poland Farmland availability for 
residents 
X  X X 
Sweden Market transparency to avoid 
land speculation 
X X   
 
 
Land consolidators are characterised by dominant policy objectives that relate to the 
avoidance/remediation of land fragmentation. In practice, this includes objectives to: 
create/maintain agricultural land holdings large enough to support families/businesses; 
tenant security; and facilitate ownership of unused land. The countries in this group are 
shown in Table 9.  
 
The interventions applied to deliver these objectives tend to include one or more of: 
 
1. Pre-emptive rights by individuals to buy land; 
2. Minimum area limits for all purchasers; 
3. Scheme(s) to consolidate land holdings. 
Table 9: Land consolidators - policy objective and interventions 
Country Dominant policy objective Dominant 
intervention(s) 
  
  Pre-emptive 
rights 
(individuals) 
Minimum area 
limits 
Consolidation 
schemes 
Belgium Avoid land fragmentation X   
Cyprus Avoid land fragmentation  X X 
Czech 
Republic 
Transfer abandoned land to 
the state 
  X 
Portugal Avoid land fragmentation X   
Spain Avoid land fragmentation X X  
Slovakia Avoid land fragmentation X X  
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4. CASE STUDIES 
This section considers the shortlisted countries in each group in more detail. Country case 
studies are presented under the following common headings to allow comparative reference 
and understanding: summary of restrictions; structures/incentives to monitor arrangements; 
and success and impacts of the intervention(s). Country-specific references for further 
reading can be found in Annex 5. 
 
4.1 Foreign interest limiters 
4.1.1 Australia 
Summary of restrictions 
The majority of Australian land is held on a non-freehold basis. Much land is held by 
perpetual and long-term pastoral leases that can essentially be treated as if they are 
ownership owing to the rights conferred by such arrangements. Meanwhile, almost all 
metropolitan (urban) land is freehold, with disproportionately high value relative to area20.  
 
From the colonial era until the 1970s, to a greater or lesser extent there was an official 
‘White Australia’ policy. Whilst that no longer prevails, protectionism of the established 
population is still evident in legislative measures that began to take shape in the 1970s 
(notably with the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975) and reforms to the foreign 
investment framework that were introduced in 2015-16. Current legislation requires foreign 
persons to apply for investment approval before purchasing residential real estate or vacant 
residential land for development. Foreign persons are generally required to build new 
properties (rather than purchase existing ones), in order to create additional jobs in the 
construction industry and support economic growth. 
 
The purchase of agricultural land by foreign persons or foreign-owned companies also 
requires approval where the cumulative value of the person’s agricultural land holdings 
exceeds A$15 million, although exceptions apply to investors from the trade agreement 
partners (Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, United States). All acquisitions of 
agricultural land by foreign government investors or foreign state-owned companies require 
approval. There are rules about the acquisition of stakes of businesses, with agribusinesses 
subjected to special rules where the value of the investment is more than A$57 million. The 
A$15 million threshold does not apply when the land is acquired by owners or operators of 
wind and solar power stations (the land is treated as ‘non-agricultural’ in this case) or for 
providing facilities for tourism, outdoor education or outdoor recreation for the public.  
 
From 1 February 2018, foreign investment will only be allowed where land has been suitably 
and transparently marketed. This is part of a national interest test to ensure that Australians 
have an opportunity to acquire a given parcel of land. Ensuring an ‘open and transparent 
sale process’ for agricultural land bought by foreign investors means21: the property is 
‘marketed widely’ - it must be listed/advertised on widely-used real estate listing websites or 
in regional/national media; the property is advertised for a minimum of 30 days; and there 
was equal opportunity for offers from citizens to be made for the agricultural land while it was 
still available for purchase. 
 
State or territory-level taxation can also play a role, as can be seen by the current land tax 
surcharge on residential properties for foreign investors in New South Wales (introduced in 
                                               
20
 For clarity, it can be noted that land ownership is a State matter both as to Torrens (registered 
freehold/ownership) and non-freehold land, meaning it is the Crown in the right of the state that exercises 
jurisdiction over property in land, not the Commonwealth. But the Commonwealth can play a role to regulate the 
investment aspects of land, with reference to the power contained in s 51(xx) of the Constitution relating to 
‘foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth’. 
21
 More information can be found on the FIRB website. 
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2017) and the planned imposition of a similar tax increase on foreign investors in the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT), to rebalance the market for local buyers. From 1 July 
2018, foreign investors in the ACT will pay an additional 0.75% on the average unimproved 
value of residential properties22. 
 
Structures/incentives to monitor arrangements 
The Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), in line with related foreign investment 
legislation, monitors and approves foreign investment. The system relating to foreign 
investment is inherently discretionary, i.e. time is needed for the FIRB to make up its mind. 
The decision maker generally has a statutory period of 30 days to make a decision (as from 
the date when an application is made and the relevant fee paid), and a further ten days to 
notify the outcome23.  
 
For more complex issues, where a decision cannot be made within 30 days, an interim order 
within the decision period can be made, but this cannot be for a period of more than 90 days. 
An applicant can also voluntarily extend the 30-day period. The FIRB normally approves 
applications to purchase vacant land subject to construction being completed within four 
years (to prevent land banking). To avoid properties lying vacant, since May 2017, foreign 
persons who purchase residential real estate have been subject to an annual vacancy 
charge when they do not rent or occupy the property for more than six months per year.  
 
The Register of Foreign Ownership of Water or Agricultural Land Act 2015 requires that 
information about foreign persons’ holdings of agricultural land is obtained and published. It 
should be noted that a national strategy for cadastral reform is currently underway24. This, 
combined with the requirements of foreign ownership registration will allow better 
understanding of trends in foreign land ownership. Separately, it can be noted that 
Queensland has a register tracking foreign ownership of land, flowing from the Foreign 
Ownership of Land Register Act 1988. Failure to comply with this legislation (for example, by 
making a false or misleading statement) is an offence. 
 
Success and impacts of the intervention(s) 
Because decisions related to foreign investment are made on a case-by-case basis and are 
discretionary, it is difficult to extrapolate overall effects. While the discretionary system for 
foreign investment tends to allow adaptation to specific circumstances, the initial starting 
point that so many foreign transactions are caught by potential regulation could feed into 
protectionist rhetoric. One high-profile foreign acquisition of a large land area (Cubby 
Station, a cotton farm) was approved notwithstanding the system. Matters may have been 
different if this had been a wheat farm (although there was a political context and other 
factors were also at play). This example illustrates how some commodities appear to be less 
valued by FIRB than others. 
 
It is also difficult to gauge the effects of interventions on land prices and the availability of 
land, but country experts suggest there are perceptions that when foreign investment is in an 
area with a view to aggregate buying, prices can go up. Australia continues to attract a large 
volume of foreign investment applications (41,445 in 2015-16, compared to 37,953 in 2014-
15), largely driven by residential real estate transactions. It is difficult to measure the impact 
of foreign investment policies on housing values/affordability. The increased regulation has 
impacted property developers, and demand from Chinese investors has slowed down. 
However, the concern that the tightening of norms by FIRB would lead to defaults on 
settlement has not materialised (the Australian system requires 5% payment when securing 
a property and 95% on completion and possession). Most settlements have happened. In 
                                               
22
 ‘Increased land tax for foreign investors’ 05.02.2018, ACT Open Government website. 
23
 Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975. 
24
 Cadastre 2034: Powering Land and Real Property. 
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that sense, restriction has been less effective. For domestic investors, Australia allows 
negative gearing where losses from one investment can be offset against income from other 
sources thus reducing the tax liability. This tax break aids investment and the relative cost of 
funds and lower risk to invest in Australia is important for foreigners. 
 
Although the flow of applications for the purchase of agricultural land has increased since 
thresholds were lowered in 2015, the proportion of agricultural land with a level of foreign 
ownership has fallen from 14.1% in June 2016 to 13.6% in June 2017. It can also be noted 
that FIRB limits do not always catch acquisitions, notably within the sheep/wheat belt in 
Western Australia, where there have been several high-profile, large transactions which 
have altered ownership of agricultural land. For example, the recent sale of S Kidman and 
Co to Australian Outback Beef has increased the level of Chinese ownership of agricultural 
land by 2.6 million hectares (0.7%)25. The UK remains the largest foreign agricultural land 
holder with 2.5%. 
 
There is some tension between the protectionist motivations that underpin the restrictions 
and a desire for development and expansion. Historically, that desire affected the evolution 
of land tenures, many of which came with requirements for improvements to land or 
otherwise benefitting the public, which in turn suggests that protectionist concerns might give 
way to desires to develop infrastructure in certain specific cases. Amidst a need for inward 
investment, protectionism is also perceived politically as popular, so no imminent change in 
the interventions is expected. 
 
4.1.2 Switzerland 
Summary of restrictions 
Switzerland is a very densely populated country with a varied geography differentiated into 
three main regions: Alpine, Jura (upland) and plains. About 25% of the country is used for 
farming year round, with an additional 13% accessible in the late spring and summer for 
pasture. More than half of Swiss farms are between five and 20 hectares in size. The extent 
of agricultural land is decreasing, due to development pressure in the plains and the spread 
of forests in the Alpine and Jura regions. Retaining agricultural land is a policy priority.  
 
Federal law (the ‘Lex Koller’) regulates the purchase of ‘settlement’ (non-agricultural/forest) 
land and property by people who do not reside in Switzerland or who are not of Swiss 
nationality. Foreign interests may not acquire this type of land or property if the purchase is a 
capital investment, if the size of the land or property exceeds what is deemed appropriate for 
the intended purpose, and/or if the buyer already owns land or property in the country. Both 
Swiss citizens and foreigners require a ‘Permit C’ to purchase settlement land or property: 
this permit is proof of four years of permanent residence in Switzerland. The acquisition of 
business premises is generally unrestricted, and approval for purchasing real estate for 
commercial purposes is not required. 
 
There are restrictions relating to holiday properties and second homes. Each Canton26 
allocates annual quotas for holiday properties (generally limited to 20% of all properties), and 
dwellings being purchased for this purpose must be located in areas formally designated as 
holiday resorts. In some Cantons, foreigners can purchase second homes, but they need to 
demonstrate a ‘close tie’ with the place (mainly economic, scientific or cultural interests; not 
reasons related to family/friends, holidays, study, etc.). Holiday properties and second 
homes are subject to upper area limits: the net floor space of the building must not exceed 
200m2 and the land area of the whole property must not exceed 1,000m2. Larger areas can 
                                               
25
 Chinese investors have a 33% interest in Australian Outback Beef. 
26
 Switzerland is divided into 26 Cantons of varying size. 
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be authorised based on additional need. Only one holiday property/second home may be 
owned in Switzerland at one time.  
 
A federal law on agricultural land ownership exists to support viable family farms and 
agricultural businesses, as well as to improve farm structure. The division of agricultural land 
for non-agricultural purposes is forbidden, and division of agricultural land (and vineyards) 
for agricultural purposes must not result in plots smaller than 2.5 hectares (1.5 hectares for 
vineyards). The individual Cantons can determine a larger minimum size, if required. These 
rules do not apply to land improvement/fragmentation initiatives. A ‘self-cultivation’ principle 
also exists: owners and/or tenants have to be able to cultivate the land themselves and have 
relevant qualifications/experience. There are additional restrictions that prohibit felling of 
forest for settlement (development) purposes. 
 
Structures/incentives to monitor arrangements 
Each Canton has the following structures in place to monitor the purchase of all land or 
property in its territory: 
 An authority or authorities to approve or deny the purchase of land/ property; 
 An authority or authorities with the constitutional right to ‘complain’ about the 
purchase of land/ property; and 
 An appeals process. 
 
After initial approval, the application is passed to the authority with the constitutional right to 
complain. If there are no complaints, the application is passed to a federal authority (Federal 
Office of Justice), which makes the final decision. 
 
The main reasons for rejection of applications to purchase agricultural land include: the 
buyer is not a farmer; the agreed land price is too high (each Canton determines the price for 
land within its borders, and there is also a country-wide maximum price); and/or the land to 
be purchased is not located within the business area of the buyer. Within-family transfer of 
agricultural land is preferred, with inheritance law ensuring that the closest next of kin will 
inherit land, as long as they intend to use the land for agricultural purposes. 
 
Success and impacts of the intervention(s) 
In contrast to neighbouring countries (France, Germany, Italy, Austria), there is no marked 
difference in land and property prices in Switzerland because land speculation does not 
generally take place. However, there is current debate about instances where the restrictions 
have been breached due to loopholes in the legislation and/or where the various public 
authorities have not applied lack of regulations or penalties. Similar situations have occurred 
in relation to the purchase of holiday properties by foreign investors. It has been vigorously 
debated recently whether the restrictions on foreigners should be abolished or made stricter. 
Despite a decision in 2014 by the Swiss Parliament to relax the rules of the Lex Koller, the 
Swiss Federal Council announced in 2015 the intention to revise and tighten the restrictions. 
A decision on this was delayed several times and a consultation closed in June 2017, with 
mostly negative feedback about the proposal to tighten the regulations.  
 
In particular, the proposal to restrict the acquisition of commercial properties by foreigners 
was strongly criticised due to concerns about negative impacts on the Swiss economy. The 
Swiss government will soon modernise the Lex Koller. Under the new law, non-EU/EEA 
residents who live in Switzerland and possess a resident permit will only be able to purchase 
property as their main residence. When a property is no longer a main residence, non-
EU/EEA residents will be required to sell their property within two years. Stricter laws are 
also due to be implemented regarding the conversion of business premises to residential 
property, and to the acquisition of land by foreign companies (only companies that have their 
main office in Switzerland will be able to purchase land). 
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Land use planning rules related to agricultural land (e.g. no commercial building, limited size 
of buildings, no apartments except for farm families) are becoming less strict and are often 
disregarded, with the relevant administrative authorities failing to impose penalties. It is also 
quite straightforward for the Cantons to ‘swap’ land from agricultural areas to settlement 
(development) areas. Although the federal government has to approve such changes, the 
federal administration is seen as weak in this regard and applications are normally approved. 
These swaps have therefore been a contentious issue. A new law relating to 
Fruchtfolgeflächen (FFF) has recently been introduced to preserve agricultural land to 
ensure sufficient food supply: a minimum area of ‘FFF land’ (i.e. the most productive land for 
agriculture) has been determined for each Canton. 
 
4.2 Land use stipulators 
4.2.1 Germany 
Summary of restrictions 
Agricultural land in Germany comprises around 80% of all personally-owned private 
property. Over half of this belongs to large agricultural businesses with more than 100 
hectares, and the number of operating farms has fallen significantly over the past few 
decades. The average size of a farm is 56 hectares, ranging from 31 hectares in Baden-
Württemberg to 290 hectares in new federal states (Länder) in the former East Germany 
(Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen) 
(Bahner, 2012). After the reunification of Germany, the German Land Use and Management 
Company (BVVG) was established to manage public land in the new states. It is owned by 
the Federal Government and was commissioned to privatise formerly public agricultural and 
forestry land, and to return land to previous owners whose land was expropriated during 
World War II. The company is still active in the land market, and leases land to farmers and 
others in the aforementioned states. 
 
In Germany, interventions related to land ownership are designed to avoid land speculation, 
increase diversity of ownership, avoid the dominance of large land holdings, secure the 
future of agriculture, protect farmers’ interests, and limit rises in land prices. To achieve 
these aims, the purchase and sale of agricultural land are regulated under the 
Grundstücksverkehrsgesetz (Law on the Sale of Agricultural Land). The sale of agricultural 
or forestry holdings greater than a certain size must be approved by the regulatory authority 
in the respective federal state (the lower limit for needing approval is generally between 
0.25ha and 5ha). Where parcels are not part of an agricultural or forestry holding, these can 
be sold to other private persons or institutions without approval. Transfers of land can be 
denied if: 
 
 
 
 The size of the plot would decrease below a level that does not allow economic use 
of the land; 
 The price is unreasonably high or low27; and/or 
 The sale impacts negatively on ‘healthy farm structure’. 
 
For the latter, this means that non-farmers are restricted from buying land if local farmers are 
willing to buy the land under the same conditions. In effect, farmers who are in need of 
additional land have an indirect pre-emptive right over non-farmers (again, there is some 
variation between the federal states). Examples would include: if a farmer had recently lost 
some land; if a farmer is able to show that he/she will lose land in the future; and/or that 
he/she has a high proportion of rented land. In such cases, a state-owned public land 
                                               
27
 Land price regulations differ between the federal states. In Baden-Württemberg, restrictions come into effect 
when the price is above 20% of plots with a similar agricultural quality. 
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agency that operates at the local level in the federal state can buy the plot at the price at 
which the non-farmer would buy it and then sell it to farmers in need of land. If this is not the 
case, the non-farmer may purchase the land. Approval is not required for the purchase of 
agricultural land by a public agency or by a church. 
 
There are no special governmental or legislative procedures for the approval of foreign 
investors who plan to invest in agricultural companies in Germany. Neither are there any 
legally required controls on investments that could be considered ‘foreign’. As human rights 
and fundamental freedoms apply equally to natural persons and entities in Germany, public 
authorities are unable to control investments or influence how non-German citizens or 
businesses invest in the agricultural sector.  
 
Structures/incentives to monitor arrangements 
Each completed purchase of agricultural and forest land must be presented to a designated 
committee of the relevant County Council. In Niedersachsen, for example, this committee 
comprises five people elected by the County Council, three of whom are nominated by the 
Department of Agriculture. This committee must ascertain whether the agreed sale leads to 
‘an unhealthy distribution of land’ (i.e. whether it contradicts measures to improve agricultural 
structure). This generally occurs when a non-farmer buys the land despite an eligible farmer 
being able and willing to sign the contract of sale. If this is the case, the farmer who wishes 
to purchase the land can exercise a pre-emptive right (via the responsible state agency) and 
enter into a contract under the agreed conditions. The eligible farmer can then buy the land 
at the agreed price and must also pay a doubled land transfer tax. In Baden-Württemberg, 
the state land agency can exercise the pre-emptive right even if there is no willing farmer, 
under the condition that the land will be used for agricultural operations within the following 
ten years. 
 
The Hofbörsen (land stock market) was introduced by the public agencies of the federal 
state between 2002 and 2005 to support the trade of farms between retiring farmers and 
new entrants. Farmers who intend to abandon their farm and land (e.g. due to the lack of a 
successor) can transfer their land to other existing or new farmers via this mechanism. 
 
Success and impacts of the intervention(s) 
Before 2008, when land prices were stable or rising slowly, restrictions on land sales were 
generally ignored. Since 2008, however, land prices have risen28, the interventions have 
been stricter, and the pre-emption rights for agricultural land have been exerted much more 
than previously. In 2015, 2.15% (837) of all agricultural land sales requiring approval were 
checked further by the relevant committee; pre-emptive rights were exercised in 194 (23.2%) 
of those cases29.  
 
Farmers are often not in a financial position to exercise their pre-emptive rights, due to 
increased land prices and doubled land transfer taxes. As a result, there has been a marked 
increase in the purchase of agricultural land by non-farmers, which has become the subject 
of political debate. Across Germany as a whole, it has been estimated that 20-35% of 
agricultural land sales in 2015 were concluded by non-farmers. In Niedersachsen, non-
farmers bought one third of all non-urban land sold in 2011. There also exists a significant 
loophole in the law, through which an investor (private person or company) can acquire 
shares in a large farm (mostly in eastern Germany) without needing approval, if the investor 
intends to continue farming. This means that the entry of non-agricultural investors into the 
agricultural sector is not restricted, providing indirect access to agricultural land ownership. 
                                               
28
 Due mostly to: allocation of agricultural land to residential and road building projects; price rises near bio-gas 
production plants; and privatisation of previously state-owned land in East Germany. 
29
 Bundesverband der gemeinnützigen Landgesellschaften (2017) Entwicklung und Tätigkeit 
der gemeinnützigen Landgesellschaften. 
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Since 2015, the federal states have been discussing the introduction of new laws to ensure 
future viability of agricultural operations and to avoid land concentration by non-farmers. 
 
4.2.2 Norway 
Summary of restrictions 
Most of Norway is mountainous and/or forested; only 3% of the land is used for agricultural 
purposes (Thomson et al., 2014). Several restrictions exist to keep farmland in agricultural 
use, retain agricultural land within families, maintain rural populations and avoid land 
fragmentation30: the number of farms has decreased sharply in the past couple of decades. 
Farms are generally owner-occupied and small: approximately 50% of farms have less than 
2.5 hectares of agricultural land. 
 
All sales of agricultural land require a permit (concession) from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and the prices of properties can be controlled and regulated in order to control who is able to 
acquire farm property and avoid land speculation. Farms with less than 3.5 hectares of 
arable land, or if the total area covers more than ten hectares, are excluded from this rule 
(the lower limit was increased in 2017 from 2.5 hectares to facilitate a wider range of smaller 
agricultural properties and reduce the number of uninhabited agricultural properties). A legal 
exemption from requiring a permit also exists in certain cases for family members. For 
example, when farmland is put up for sale, if a family member wishes to buy it, their pre-
emptive interest overrides that of any non-family buyer (allodial rights31). Ownership of the 
land for 20 years allows allodial rights to be conferred. Since 2013, these rights have been 
restricted to direct descendants of the owner. 
 
The ‘domicile principle’ requires that the purchase of agricultural holdings larger than ten 
hectares, or more than 3.5 hectares of arable land, is conditional on the owner residing on 
the property in persona for a minimum period of five years. This is to ensure that remote, 
rural areas continue to be populated. A minimum rental period of ten years exists for tenants 
of arable land as a prerequisite for receiving a concession to buy the land. All owners and 
tenants of agricultural land must farm the land, i.e. the soil must be cultivated and harvested 
at least once a year and pastureland must be kept in good condition. As a general rule, a 
land owner is not allowed to create and sell new properties by dividing the estate into smaller 
parcels.  
 
Structures/incentives to monitor arrangements 
If land is sold without the necessary concession, the State may take temporary ownership of 
the land for reallocation. The Ministry of Agriculture may give its consent to the creation of 
new plots if, for instance, the division facilitates a more varied farm structure. The creation of 
a plot of up to 0.5 hectares is allowed for residential use (and retirement of the farmer) in 
some cases.  
 
Success and impacts of the intervention(s) 
Recent amendments to the concession permit system (relaxing price controls and raising the 
lower area limits to allow a wider range of smaller agricultural properties) have not been 
successful in reducing the number of uninhabited agricultural properties. The rate of growth 
of the number of uninhabited farms has been consistent since 2001. Since 2010, fewer 
properties have been subject to price controls, with the aim of more properties coming on to 
the market. There has been some debate about this decision: farming representatives 
support price controls to ensure affordability of farmland, while others have raised concerns 
                                               
30
 Formal land consolidation schemes also exist to reallocate and redistribute land to improve agricultural 
efficiency. 
31
 Odelsrett is the Norwegian law stipulating the right, when a farm is to be sold, of any member of the family to 
buy it, by the principle of primogeniture (Åsetesrett). The word ‘allodial’ used to prevail in Scotland as a term for 
non-feudal land, and as such these two meanings of ‘allodial’ are not to be confused. 
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about the price controls leading to under-investment in farms. Relaxing price controls was 
expected to lead to increases in sale prices and encourage owners of uninhabited properties 
to sell their land. Small farm properties have increased in price (and sales have been more 
frequent) in more populated areas and popular recreation areas, but the numbers of land 
transactions in more remote, rural areas remain low. Recent research has concluded that 
this is partially due to the greater importance of family and emotional attachment of owners 
to land in these places, as compared to capital gain from sale. 
 
The requirement to reside on the land appears to have been effective in ensuring that 
farmland is bought by people who wish to remain on the land for at least five years. When 
farmers purchase land, 90% are highly likely to remain on the land for 30 years or more. 
Those who apply for ‘delayed residency’ or permanent dispensation from the domicile 
requirement are likely to remain for ten years or less. However, the rules have not always 
ensured that those residing on farms are actively farming the land, with tenants doing this 
instead. This reflects the fact that the system is not as strict in practice as it might appear to 
be: increasing numbers of people are using farms as a residence and not an active farm.  
 
The preference for within-family transfers and the residency restriction have also reduced 
the opportunity for farm expansion via land purchase: the latter places an indirect limit set on 
the number of agricultural properties that can be owned by one person or couple (as they 
cannot be resident in two places), but another property can be purchased after residing for 
five years, while retaining the original property. Increases in the average farm size have 
been achieved by leasing land rather than transfer of ownership. (i.e. farmers leaving the 
industry retain ownership and then lease the land to others). The practical challenges 
imposed by allodial rights and the concession permit mean that the purchase of agricultural 
land in Norway by legal entities or non-resident landlords is rare.  
 
4.2.3 Poland 
Summary of restrictions 
Most of the land in Poland is owned and operated by small family farms and significant 
regulations exist to protect these (Swinnen et al., 2013). Average farm size is approximately 
10 hectares. Approximately 20% of agricultural land is leased and another 19% is owned by 
the state, with sales of state land limited due to restitution claims (Ciaian et al., 2012). 
Poland is heavily forested and 81% of forests are owned publicly. There are no restrictions 
on private forest owners selling forests on the open market, and the low profitability of forest 
land means that there is little demand for small-scale forest ownership. The privatisation 
process of the 1990s was hindered by restitution claims. However, since 2010, the sale of 
estate land with restitution claims has been possible, with first right to buy given to the 
former owner and their successor, and then to leaseholders (if the land had been leased for 
at least three years).  
 
Until 2016, there were restrictions on ownership by foreign natural persons and legal entities 
with a majority of the shares owned by foreigners. Non-EU/EEA buyers were excluded from 
buying agricultural land although they could buy if they had previously leased (and farmed) 
agricultural land for 3-7 years (Thomson et al., 2014). Since 2016, legislation continues to 
restrict foreigners from buying land, as they require a permit from the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, issued only to those who can prove a connection to Poland, e.g. holding a temporary 
or permanent residence permit. The sale of State-owned land has been halted for five years 
to all buyers. This is to protect agricultural land from speculative purchase by both domestic 
and foreign buyers, following the end of the transitory restrictions implemented when Poland 
joined the EU. There were concerns that land would not be used for agriculture if available 
for purchase. Instead, permanent leasing of State-owned land is promoted.  
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The following restrictions on the sale of private land were also introduced in 2015, prior to 
the expiration of the transitory arrangements:  
 agricultural land parcels larger than 0.3 hectares can only be bought by an 
individual farmer (not a legal entity)32; 
 individual farmers may own up to 300 hectares of agricultural land;  
 they must be formally qualified as a farmer (i.e. have agricultural skills);  
 they must have lived in a rural municipality for at least five years; and 
 they must pledge to work the land personally for a decade.  
 
These restrictions exist to keep farmland in agricultural use, protect and increase the 
productivity of small family farms, and avoid land ownership concentration. There are also 
legislative measures in place to decrease farmland fragmentation due to small cultivated 
fields that are often remote from farms, and CAP subsidies are structured to incentivise land 
consolidation. 
 
Structures/incentives to monitor arrangements 
The Agricultural Property Agency (developed in 1992, now the National Centre for Support 
of Agriculture, KOWAR) was created to privatise State land (from communist era State 
farms) and facilitate the development of commercial family farms, functioning as a State land 
bank (Hartvigsen, 2013). From 2003, it has also had a pre-emptive right on all agricultural 
land transactions, to reduce speculation and encourage the development of commercial 
family farms.  This is a general pre-emptive right that can be applied in the case of a sale 
that is not perceived to be in the public interest, although it has been used relatively rarely. 
Out of more than 270,000 cases related to around 400,000 hectares, pre-emption rights 
have been exercised on 293 holdings covering around 6,500 hectares. All sales transactions 
for agricultural land must be reported to KOWAR, which can intervene to cap excessive local 
price rises. When KOWAR uses its rights as a pre-emptive buyer, a case-by-case decision is 
made regarding the criteria with which to calculate land price. 
 
Success and impacts of the intervention(s) 
In the run up to the end of the transitory restrictions on foreigners purchasing agricultural 
land, there was popular and political concern about the ability of foreign companies to buy 
land in partnership with Polish citizens who then transferred ownership to companies after 
purchasing the land themselves. Protests by farmers in Warsaw highlighted the concerns 
about Western companies buying land and the impact of this for protecting family farms. The 
legislation enacted in 2016 appears to have allayed these concerns.  
 
There is some concern that the restrictions on foreigners violate EU law regarding free 
movement of EU citizens. There are also concerns that strict measures to reduce 
speculation may have unintended economic consequences, such as falling land prices, 
although prices are now increasing and there is a high level of demand for farmland. A 
further potential impact of restricting land ownership for those outside Poland is a reduction 
in the influx of innovation and new farming approaches. Polish farmers have benefited from 
the presence of farmers from other parts of Europe, learning from their associated 
technological innovation. 
 
The five-year restriction on the sale of State-owned land has had the effect of greatly 
reducing the number of sales of agricultural properties in this sector from around 100,000 
hectares per annum (prior to the legislation) to 17,700 hectares in 2017. There has been a 
marked increase in the area of leased land and increases of an average of 10% in land 
rental prices (Sikorska, 2017). Farmers that already own larger areas of agricultural land 
have tended to take on additional leased land from smaller farmers to strengthen their 
                                               
32
 An individual farmer is defined as a person with agricultural skills who runs a farm not larger than 300 hectares 
and have lived in a rural municipality for at least five years. 
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market position. Farmers with small farms are unwilling to sell their land as it is viewed as an 
important investment, but leasing to farmers with larger holdings is popular.  
 
An increase in non-market trade via family acquisitions of land was also recorded in 2016 
(Sikorska, 2017). The reduction in the availability of farmland has led to increases in the 
price of all agricultural land (both private and state-owned). This is thought to be due to 
growing competition between the use of land for farming and non-farming purposes. Indeed, 
tensions can arise over the lack of availability of land for purposes such as infrastructural 
development and tourism. In some areas (particularly peri-urban areas), there is 
considerable demand for farmland, while in other areas land abandonment is an issue. 
Agricultural land is generally very highly valued (personally), and changing the structure of 
land ownership is a slow and difficult process. While it is viewed as important to create larger 
farms that can compete with those in other parts of Europe, there are also concerns over 
industrialisation as green production is favoured. 
 
While recent legislation has been focused on ensuring the survival of small family farms and 
the livelihoods and ways of life associated with these, land ownership remains highly 
fragmented, as the uptake of consolidation schemes by farmers is low. Interest in land 
consolidation has declined due to the complexity of the regulations. There appears to be a 
reluctance of farmers to participate due to this complexity and uncertainty about cost 
regulations. There is also an historical lack of engagement between farmers and state actors 
which has presented a challenge. The issue of unresolved ownership has also led to 
uncertainty and a slow rate of land transactions. Recent research has suggested that there 
is no evidence that farmland fragmentation prevents economic productivity in Poland. Small 
family farms have been found to generate good profit, sometimes larger than that of a 
commercially-oriented land holding. However, it should be noted that there are greater areas 
of unused agricultural land in regions with the highest degrees of fragmentation, compared 
to those in the areas of the former state agricultural farms. 
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4.3 Land consolidators 
4.3.1 Slovakia 
Summary of restrictions 
Land use is concentrated in Slovakia, with most of the utilised agricultural area (UAA) 
(76.7% in 2013) cultivated by 1.5% of the total number of farms, in holdings greater than 50 
hectares (Biró, 2017). This is the legacy of the gradual liquidation of family farms under 
communism, when agricultural production was organised into large-scale collective and state 
farms. 75% of agricultural land is owned by private persons and there are many small farms 
(91.3% of all farms, under ten hectares in area) that cultivate only 3.4% of all agricultural 
land. The fragmented nature of land under this type of ownership hinders development of the 
land market, and land consolidation is a long-term measure for increasing agricultural 
production efficiency. There has been a steady increase in the number of legal entities 
purchasing and renting farmland in Slovakia, with corporate farms dominating the rental 
market. 20% of UAA remains under the administration of the Slovak Land Fund, created for 
the restitution of land seized historically by the state from private owners. 
 
Rights of first refusal were established in 2014 to ensure protection of agricultural land (i.e. 
ownership by people with the relevant skills and experience) and to protect land from foreign 
interests following the end of restrictions on foreign ownership after Slovakia joined the EU. 
Farmers must have conducted agricultural business for at least three years in a specific 
municipality before being able to buy land in this municipality without requiring approval. 
Young farmers (aged under 40 with certain skills, purchasing for the first time) are exempt 
from this rule, to enable new entrants to purchase land. For other individuals or entities 
willing to purchase agricultural land, a preference order exists. Criteria for determining the 
preferred buyer include residence in Slovakia for at least ten years and, in the case of 
foreigners, reciprocity (i.e., the legislation of their home country allows equivalent purchases 
by Slovak citizens). Legal entities registered in Slovakia can purchase agricultural land if 
they fulfil similar conditions, including the requirement to conduct agricultural business for at 
least three years prior to purchase. Non-Slovak EU citizens can acquire agricultural land on 
the same terms as Slovaks. 
 
Fees for land division were also established in 2014 to prevent land fragmentation. 
Agricultural land may not be divided into parcels smaller than 0.2 hectares, and forest land 
into less than 0.5 hectares (although this rule does not apply to community forests). Co-
ownership shares smaller than the minimum are also prohibited. If a new plot is between 0.5 
and 2 hectares, a fee amounting to 10% of the agricultural land value must be paid. For 
forest land, this applies to plots between 1 and 2 hectares in area. A fee amounting to 20% 
of the value of the land must be paid if an agricultural plot between 0.2 and 0.5 hectares is 
created (0.5-1 hectare for forest land). Agricultural land value is calculated by a legal 
regulation created for land consolidation purposes, and the fees are collected as state 
budget revenue. Exemptions to the minimum area rules include: subdivision for building 
purposes; subdivision due to restitutions; difficulties in joining land with other plots; and the 
establishment of gardens/recreation areas in line with municipality development plans. 
 
Structures/incentives to monitor arrangements 
The seller of agricultural or forest land must publish the sale on the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development website and on the notice board in the public office of the 
municipality in which the land is located. A potential buyer must then record interest in the 
land, both in the online register and at the address, within the time specified. Interested 
buyers are then prioritised as follows: 
1. A farmer who has conducted an agricultural business for at least three years in the 
municipality in which the land is situated (young farmers under 40 are exempt); 
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2. A person who has had permanent residence or a registered office in Slovakia for at 
least ten years and carried out agricultural production as a business for at least three 
years in either (a) the municipality adjoining that where the land is being sold or (b) 
regardless of place of business; 
3. A person who has had permanent residence or a registered office in Slovakia for at 
least ten years. 
 
The sale price is non-negotiable: potential buyers may only accept or refuse the price 
stipulated by the land owner. 
 
Success of the intervention(s) 
The process complicates land transactions, not only for foreigners but also for farmers who 
want to increase their acreage of cultivated agricultural land. The process does not appear to 
have restricted purchases for non-agricultural purposes (e.g. development projects, other 
buildings), with an estimated 30% of transactions involving farmers as purchasers. 
 
The interventions have substantially improved the amount of available information on the 
agricultural land market due to the obligation to advertise sales publicly. However, the 
interventions have impeded the development of the market by restricting the types of 
potential purchasers, affecting the disposal right of owners, and increasing transaction costs. 
The amount of bureaucracy involved in land transactions has also increased. In general, 
there are no statistically significant differences between land prices before the existence of 
the interventions and current land prices (with the exception of the Prešov region where 
grassland land prices are much higher than before the interventions were enacted, and in 
Bratislava and Nitra, where prices are lower). The ability of the seller to set a non-negotiable 
purchase price has also been used to exclude potential buyers who have the right of priority 
but who are not in a financial position to complete the sale. It is this factor that has led to little 
change in the land market, as most farmers do not have the capital to complete the sales. 
On the other hand, foreign buyers can buy agricultural land relatively easily by setting up a 
legal entity and satisfying the residence requirements. Foreign interests now own 
approximately 20,000 hectares (1% of UAA) (Kay et al., 2015). 
 
The minimum area restrictions have also caused disputes among heirs who inherit land that 
cannot be subdivided. In these cases, a court process is required to award the land to the 
most qualified recipient (in terms of agricultural experience), and other heirs may receive 
compensation from him/her. 
 
The permanent residence condition has been considered from a legal perspective by the 
European Commission due to concerns that the rule violates the principles of non-
discrimination set out in the Treaty of Rome. The intervention condition is likely to be 
amended in due course to accommodate this concern, and the political acceptance of the 
interventions is in a state of flux.  
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5. DISCUSSION: LESSONS FOR SCOTLAND 
Land market interventions that restrict who can own land and how much they can own are 
both common and varied in the 22 countries considered in this study. Many of the 
interventions in other countries exist to mitigate against excessive land concentration or land 
fragmentation. The typology of land market interventions to restrict ownership (Section 3.2) 
demonstrates that countries choose to implement interventions for a range of reasons.  
 
The range of interventions in the different countries reflects different social, cultural, 
economic and political drivers, one or all of which may have led to the implementation of 
measures to deliver associated policy objectives. While it might be expected that similar 
types of interventions would be observed in countries that are similar in terms of economic 
development, geographic location and political institutions, the degree of variation in the 
findings presented above is in line with previous studies that have sought to understand 
interventions in sales markets in the EU (e.g. Ciaian et al., 2012). Interventions can be 
classified into six groups that relate to: foreign ownership of land; ownership approval 
processes; upper and lower area limits; owner characteristics and land use requirements; 
pre-emptive rights to buy land; and measures to reduce land fragmentation.  
 
The remainder of this section considers the relevance of these interventions to the Scottish 
context and identifies lessons that Scotland could learn from the experiences of other 
countries. 
 
5.1 Aligning ownership and public interest 
It was striking that some form of approval exists in relation to who can own land in 18 
of the 22 countries considered in this study. Twelve countries have rules that require 
foreign land acquisitions to be approved in some way prior to completion33. Approval 
processes of this nature exist to check the public interest impacts related to land purchase 
by a non-citizen. Often, this is to address concerns that foreign purchases may have 
negative impacts on local environmental and cultural heritage, or on the socio-economic 
development of a region. Approval processes to protect ‘sensitive land’ in New Zealand, 
national parks in Iceland, and cultural and language heritage in the Finnish Åland Islands 
provide some examples. Similarly, very recent changes to the rules in Australia allow foreign 
purchases only after the land has been suitably and transparently marketed. This ensures 
that land cannot be sold without public awareness through an open and transparent sale 
process. In the case studies, the requirement for formal approval of foreign land acquisitions 
had the benefit that data on foreign interests were collected, allowing long-term trends to be 
monitored and transparency to be improved. It was not always possible to understand the 
other effects of approval processes, with approval often discretionary and on a case-by-case 
basis, which may reduce trust and/or confidence in the system, especially when high-profile 
land purchases that receive approval appear not to be in the public interest. 
 
It is important to note that approval processes are not limited to land acquisitions by 
foreigners: six countries34 on the longlist (two of which have already been counted in the 
foreign ownership approval processes) require the relevant authority to approve all 
purchases of agricultural land. Underlying concerns in these countries tend to be the local 
residence of the land owner, the protection of agriculture, and the avoidance of land 
fragmentation. The Swedish approval process for ‘sparsely populated areas’ focuses 
specifically on ensuring that buyers contribute to the retention of populations and 
employment opportunities in remote areas. In this example, buyers who do not intend to 
reside on the land, or who intend to use the land only for the hunting rights and not as a 
                                               
33
 Australia, Austria, Canada (Québec), Cyprus, Denmark, Finland (Åland Islands), Iceland, New Zealand, 
Poland, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland. 
34
 Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. 
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residence, would not be granted approval by the relevant regional authority. In Germany, a 
close eye is kept on transactions above set lower limits in order to avoid land concentration. 
 
A formal approval process related to the purchase of land or property does not exist in 
Scotland. Based on the experience in other countries, developing such a framework would 
not be unusual and may present an opportunity to consolidate what is in the public interest in 
terms of who can own land. It would be worth noting the challenges experienced in Australia 
when the Foreign Investment Review Board was criticised for giving preferential treatment to 
applications from particular rural industries (see Section 4.1.1), as well as the lessons from 
Switzerland, where a rigorous approval process was found to be effective only with full 
support at the national level for approving/denying applications (see Section 4.1.2). The 
Swedish example of approving agricultural land purchases in remote areas is also pertinent: 
a land owner is required to reside on the property and contribute to local employment (see 
Section 3.1.2). The community right to buy for sustainable development (in Part 5 of the 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, which is likely to come into force in 2019) may present an 
opportunity to consider specific and general approval processes, and the relative importance 
of specific criteria for approving land purchases, in more detail. That framework only allows 
for a forced sale in highly particular circumstances. An analysis of how this comes to operate 
(alongside an analysis of the other community rights to buy, which require acquisitions to be 
in the public interest and compatible with sustainable development) will present an 
opportunity to gauge what standards community owners are being held to at the acquisition 
stage. 
 
Other restrictions on foreign land acquisitions in nine of the 22 countries35 exist 
predominantly to protect public interest, prevent land speculation, and ensure the 
ability of local farmers to purchase agricultural land. Countries can, to some extent, be 
grouped further within the ‘foreign interest limiter’ category of the land market interventions 
typology. Australia and New Zealand focus on the housing market, with restrictions imposed 
on foreign persons and legal entities to address affordability concerns. In some 
states/provinces in the USA and Canada, acreage limits for foreign persons and legal 
entities buying agricultural land are to ensure that land is available for citizens. In Europe, 
Denmark and Switzerland impose residency restrictions on foreign persons (and on legal 
entities to some extent), prior to purchasing all types of land and property.  
 
Restricting foreign acquisitions of land and property may have negative effects on the 
economy by reducing inward investment: a topic of vigorous debate in Switzerland. To the 
extent that it could be ascertained in the case studies, restricting foreign ownership does not 
appear to have a direct impact on land prices, although the impact of recent interventions in 
Australia and New Zealand to restrict foreign purchases in the residential housing market 
should be monitored.  
 
The purchase of Scottish land by foreigners is not restricted. While this is a situation that 
differs from some countries in this study where the ownership of land by foreign interests is 
restricted to some extent, outright bans on foreign ownership are not common (and in EU 
Member States, restrictions cannot easily be placed on EU citizens). The UK is currently 
restricted by EU law in terms of limiting land acquisitions by people or entities from other EU 
Member States. However, this situation may change after Brexit, subject to other treaty 
obligations that either fill any void left by the UK’s departure from the EU or are negotiated 
as part of a transition or final deal with the EU. As explained in the introduction, customary 
international law places no restrictions on limiting foreign acquisitions. In Scotland, 
motivations to restrict foreign ownership of large land parcels may be linked to the negative 
implications of a foreign land owner not being resident on the land, with purchases 
predominantly for recreational and/or speculative purposes (as explained in the introduction). 
                                               
35
 Australia, Canada; Cyprus; Denmark; Iceland; New Zealand; Singapore; Switzerland; USA. 
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Where similar concerns have been raised in other countries, an approval process exists to 
restrict land purchases (regardless of the origin of the purchaser) that may lead to these 
concerns becoming a reality. 
 
5.2 Sustaining agriculture and rural communities 
Few countries were found to impose limits on the amount of land that can be held in a 
single ownership. In some cases, restrictions that affect how much agricultural land can be 
held in a single ownership were to ensure that agricultural land is not sold to non-agricultural 
investors. In many of the countries, owner-occupied family farming is currently and 
historically the preferred form of agricultural tenure, with minimum and maximum area limits 
generally in existence to protect family farms. In these countries, limits are perceived as 
planning control mechanisms rather than restrictions on ownership rights or mechanisms for 
land redistribution.  
 
An upper limit for the ownership of land by individual farmers exists in Poland and also for 
foreigners in some other countries, although the political popularity of such limits appears to 
be time-dependent, as illustrated by the recent decision to remove such limits in Denmark. It 
proved challenging to ascertain the impacts of upper acreage limits imposed on foreigners in 
Canada, with country experts suggesting they were no longer seen ‘as important as other 
measures’. Restrictions related to minimum area limits were more common, with land not 
allowed to be divided into parcels below a minimum size in six countries36, in order to ensure 
viable agricultural and forest enterprises. In Scotland, discussions surrounding the imposition 
of an upper limit on land holdings have been related to land concentration rather than 
fragmentation, although concerns regarding the purchase of land solely for investment have 
also been aired.  
 
Pre-emptive rights for individuals wishing to purchase farmland exist in seven of the 22 
countries. In general, individual pre-emptive rights exist to avoid land fragmentation as 
well as to offer increased security for tenants. In Belgium, Norway, and Switzerland, 
close family relatives have a priority over tenants; in Poland and Portugal, neighbouring 
agricultural tenants have a pre-emptive right to buy, to address productivity issues related to 
small farm size by encouraging larger units. In Spain, a similar rule applies to neighbouring 
owners.  
 
The Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 grants a pre-emptive right to the agricultural 
tenant to buy the land that they lease, and there is no rule of priority for family members. 
Pre-emptive rights also allow communities in Scotland to purchase land before a property is 
placed on the open market (see Section 1.5). A dominant motivation for the Scottish 
interventions is security of tenure and local control of land. In other countries, motivations for 
such pre-emptive rights are different and include: enabling farmers to expand farms by 
buying neighbouring plots; keeping farms within families; ensuring farmers are given priority 
over non-farmers when agricultural and/or forest land comes onto the market; and avoiding 
land fragmentation.  
 
Fragmentation of land in Scotland is rare and generally not a concern. However, 
fragmentation can arise in instances where a land owner dies with no will and the rules of 
intestacy in the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 operate to give more than one person an 
entitlement to relevant land, or where there is a will and for some reason the land is split up 
by the testator. Succession rules in Scotland allow land to be bequeathed to a single person 
or entity, with concerns about agricultural land fragmentation contributing to the lack of any 
amendment to allow family members to compulsorily share land.  
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 Austria, Cyprus, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. 
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In the countries studied, the implementation of restrictions on land ownership was more 
commonly driven by land speculation than by the intention to limit concentration of 
ownership, although these two issues are often linked.  In some countries, the state has a 
pre-emptive right to acquire and protect sensitive sites and to buy land for development 
and/or regeneration. In countries where price controls on sales of agricultural land exist37, 
they tend not to be used strictly, or have limited impacts and are politically unpopular. 
However, the presence of such interventions allows public authorities to vary how they are 
applied, being stricter in times of rising land prices, when farmers cannot afford to exercise 
their pre-emptive right and land purchases by non-farmers may dominate. The pre-emptive 
right of the state is also used as a measure to reduce land speculation in some countries. 
For example, in Poland, where the public agency for agriculture has a pre-emptive right on 
all agricultural land transactions for this reason, falling land prices were expected as a result. 
However, this has not been the case, with prices and demand for land now rising. In the 
Czech Republic, the pre-emptive right of the state to agricultural land also allows abandoned 
land or land with an ‘unknown owner’ to be brought into public ownership.  
 
A pre-emptive right of the state to purchase land does not exist in Scotland. In other 
countries, this right exists for a range of reasons, such as ensuring that land remains 
affordable (particularly for farmers) and enabling development/regeneration projects. There 
may be scope for such an intervention to offer an opportunity to bring vacant land in 
Scotland into community or public ownership, which could operate alongside the upcoming 
provision for the community right to buy mechanism for wholly or mainly abandoned or 
neglected land. Such a policy change is likely to meet with considerable opposition with 
concerns over how the land is to be valued. 
 
5.3 Legal considerations 
Constitutional treatment of property and other human rights considerations can be important 
brakes and perhaps even accelerants for legal measures that seek to re-allocate or control 
property rights in any given legal system. Scotland’s particular situation owes much to the 
embedding of an important human rights instrument in the devolution settlement. The 
Scotland Act 1998 provides that legislation which is not compliant with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) is ‘not law’38. 
 
As explained in the methodology and as detailed in Annex 3, Scotland’s devolution 
settlement and the wider UK’s place as a signatory to the ECHR was an important factor in 
the selection and consideration of other countries. On that basis, two points can be set out to 
explain how Scotland can proceed in future (that is to say, how the Scottish Parliament 
would be entitled to proceed, not whether it should).  
 
First, in terms of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, an owner has a right to peaceful 
enjoyment of his/her possessions except where that is disturbed in the public interest (non-
arbitrarily and generally with compensation)39. As to whether a legal measure does serve a 
particular social purpose, when this has come to be assessed at the European Court of 
Human Rights judges have generally afforded a certain ‘margin of appreciation’ to local 
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 France, Germany, Norway, Poland. 
38
 Similar constraints apply to legislation that is not compliant with European Union law: the possible implications 
of the UK leaving the EU on devolved law making will not be considered, save to note that Brexit will not directly 
impact on the UK and Scotland’s obligations under the ECHR. 
39
 Two reported legal cases provide useful examples of what is and is not acceptable in human rights terms and 
(in turn) the devolution settlement. What is not acceptable is made clear in a series of cases about the 
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 and the arbitrary imposition of a heavily regulated agricultural tenancy 
on a landlord without compensation, culminating in the UK Supreme Court case of Salvesen v Riddell [2013] 
UKSC 22. What is acceptable is a properly considered piece of legislation that provides for the reallocation of 
property rights within a statutory scheme that allows a landowner to make representations throughout: Pairc 
Crofters Limited and Pairc Renewables Limited v. The Scottish Ministers [2012] CSIH 96.  
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legislatures, who tend to be regarded as better placed to gauge societal concerns than the 
Court itself. Second, it should be acknowledged that human rights are not just a shield that 
can be deployed by owners (or indeed others who can find protection under it, such as 
tenants). Some other considerations – such as food security, sanitation and housing – are 
now explicitly recognised as positive rights-based drivers for land reform in Scotland, notably 
via section 98 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (as amended by the Community 
Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015). This makes explicit reference to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Whilst that incorporation is not of the 
same standing in Scots law as the embedded nature of the ECHR, it is nevertheless 
significant. 
 
5.4 Impact on land prices 
It was not possible in this research to determine how the various policy changes impacted 
land prices, due principally to a lack of detailed time series data for the period both before 
and after a policy change.  In any event, even with adequate property level data, causation is 
often difficult to determine when using econometric modelling, due to the challenges of 
controlling for so many other variables which might impact value, both macro and micro, 
such as the stage of the property cycle and the heterogeneous nature of each individual 
asset. 
 
However, policy changes can clearly have both a negative and a positive impact on the price 
of land and buildings, even though their primary motivation was not to do so. It is thus 
important to consider both the intended and unintended consequences of any new policy. In 
simple terms, the property market is characterised as being relatively illiquid, often requiring 
large capital expenditure; features large lot sizes; functions without a central trading market; 
is impacted by significant transaction costs (both fiscal and agent based); and often requires 
third party borrowing.  Moreover, at any one point in time only a relatively small number of 
buyers and sellers are active in a highly segmented marketplace. In such a scenario, policy 
interventions such as limiting foreign ownership reduce the number of potential buyers and 
may reduce the likely exchange price. Likewise, the introduction of state approval of transfer 
of ownership increases the length of the settlement process, reduces liquidity, and 
introduces the new risk of the state not granting approval.  Assuming rational risk/return 
decision making, this negatively affects the amount a purchaser would pay. That said, future 
growth or decline of property prices is not necessarily the central concern of government, but 
is important from a welfare economics perspective. 
 
Focusing on the adequacy of compulsory compensation in Scotland, Rao et al. (2017) adopt 
a capability approach advocated by Sen (1985), to argue that, when the state intervenes in 
private property rights, it deprives the landowner of the set of valuable functionings that land 
ownership brings. The particular set of functionings is unique to each land owner and 
includes the choice of use to which land can be put.  Where the state restricts the range of 
land use or prevents any future alternative use, the land price can be materially affected, 
leading to potential legal challenges. However, it may be to the benefit of the nation that the 
defined use results in positive economic benefit, if the alternative is an ownership strategy 
which involves no active use, but instead waiting speculatively for an upturn in land values.  
 
5.5 Further work 
The acquisition of agricultural land by non-farmers was a concern in several of the countries 
considered in this report. Low ownership taxes have been found to expose farmland to non-
agricultural investors, and subsidies also have an impact on land values (Swinnen et al., 
2008). The LRRG (2014) noted that tax concessions and incentive payments are important 
factors that help to maintain the concentrated pattern of large-scale private land ownership in 
Scotland: rural estates are largely classified as agricultural or forestry land, with owners 
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receiving national taxation exemptions and reliefs, and receiving public subsidies in the form 
of agricultural, forestry and other grants. While some of the land ownership interventions 
considered in this report may increase the diversity of land owners by encouraging the sale 
of properties and/or restricting who may purchase properties, potential fiscal interventions 
that accompany any such restrictions on land ownership in the countries were not 
considered. Further investigation of the extent to which changes to tax and fiscal incentives 
may lead to increased ownership diversity would be useful. 
 
It has been suggested that a mixture of passive interventions (issuing regulations and 
exercising control) and active interventions (purchasing land assets) is an important 
contributing factor for successful land policy (Melot, 2018). In this regard, active measures 
that could accompany passive interventions to regulate who can own land also require 
further consideration. Pre-emptive rights of the state have been considered in this report as 
an intervention that assigns priority to who can buy land. It is apparent that other countries 
use these rights with varying degrees of success to acquire land for allocation to the most 
appropriate users/owners, develop community infrastructure, and/or address land 
fragmentation. The LRRG recommended a review of Scotland’s compulsory purchase 
legislation to allow local authorities to register a pre-emptive right over land in the public 
interest40 and also considered the issue of fragmented or multiple ownership of land in urban 
areas41. The holding of assets in public (rather than private) land banks has also not been 
considered in this project (examples exist in the USA and the Netherlands); this approach to 
acquiring land for public benefit and addressing land fragmentation could benefit from further 
scrutiny for the Scottish context. The examples of pre-emptive purchase by the State in 
Poland, Finland, France, and the Netherlands may also warrant further examination. 
 
Restrictions on the purchase of second or holiday homes exist in Denmark, Norway and 
Switzerland. This is to ensure that permanent populations remain in remote areas and that 
prices are not inflated to a level that would affect ownership of property by local residents. 
The difficulty in finding affordable housing for local people in rural areas in Scotland has 
been well-documented, with the prevalence of holiday properties and second homes an 
important factor (e.g. Thomson et al., 2016). The approaches employed in other countries to 
restrict/control the purchase of these types of properties also warrants further consideration. 
 
                                               
40
 Section 8, point 14, p.44. 
41
 Section 5, point 49, p.128. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This research has revealed that many countries have legal mechanisms for limiting who can 
own land, in order to achieve varied policy objectives. The range of restrictions and 
associated motivations can be categorised using the typology of land market interventions 
developed in this study. This provides a useful tool for understanding the reasons for 
implementing restrictions. Based on the experiences in other countries, it would not be 
unusual if Scotland were to consider implementing restrictions on land ownership similar to 
those in place elsewhere. However, the findings presented above cannot be used to predict 
the effects of any of these interventions in Scotland, or to recommend a preferred option. 
While it may be challenging to ‘fit’ Scotland neatly into one of the three typology categories, 
this typology provides a road map for future discussions regarding the suitability of individual 
interventions in the Scottish context.  
 
This research has found that the majority of the studied countries implement approval 
processes to limit land acquisitions and/or check the credentials of prospective buyers. While 
the motivations for approval processes are not predominantly to do with avoiding 
concentration of land (as would presumably be the case in Scotland), this is a relevant factor 
in many countries and is likely to receive further attention in the current context of increased 
awareness and national/European parliamentary recognition of the negative impacts of 
farmland concentration in the EU. Importantly, these approval processes exist to ensure that 
the aspirations of prospective buyers for how they will manage the land do not have negative 
impacts on land use policy and public interest.  
 
A requirement to reside on purchased land is common in a number of countries, especially 
those where owner-occupied, family farming is the preferred model of agricultural tenure. 
While generally focussed on farmers, such motivations for residency requirements are 
strongly linked to retaining farmland in agricultural use and supporting the continuity of local 
communities in rural areas. Where approval processes require buyers to reside in an area, 
rather than manage the land from afar, the importance of a local connection to land is 
highlighted. Approval processes also allow consistent and rigorous data collection about 
land owners and any beneficial interests, improving transparency and the accuracy of land 
registry information. All of these aspects are relevant to the Scottish context, where concerns 
have been raised about the impacts of land owners’ decisions on communities and the 
public interest, and where steps are being taken to improve transparency in land ownership 
data.  
 
In the countries studied, only a few examples were identified of upper limits to the amount of 
land that any one individual or entity can own. Where such limits exist, they are often 
targeted at foreign land acquisitions and/or used as planning control mechanisms, rather 
than acting as restrictions on ownership rights or mechanisms for redistribution.  
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ANNEX 1: LONGLIST COUNTRIES’ SCORES ON FILTER INDICES 
The following table shows the scores received by the longlist countries on the Global Real 
Estate Transparency Index (GRETI), the Corruption Perception Index and the International 
Property Rights Index (IPRI). 
Table 10: Filter scores for longlist countries 
Country GRETI1 Corruption 
Perception Index2 
IPRI3 
Australia Highly transparent 79 8.244 
Austria Transparent 75 8.012 
Belgium Transparent 77 7.839 
Canada Highly transparent 82 8.179 
Cyprus Not listed* 55 5.447 
Czech Republic Transparent 55 6.860 
Denmark Transparent 90 8.158 
Finland Highly transparent 89 8.626 
France Highly transparent 69 7.336 
Germany Highly transparent 81 7.959 
Iceland Not listed* 78 7.700 
Netherlands Highly transparent 83 8.296 
New Zealand Highly transparent 90 8.633 
Norway Transparent 85 8.533 
Poland Transparent 62 6.253 
Portugal Transparent 62 6.848 
Singapore Transparent 84 8.358 
Slovakia Transparent 51 6.396 
Spain Transparent 58 6.422 
Sweden Transparent 88 8.608 
Switzerland Transparent 86 8.561 
USA Highly transparent 74 8.074 
United Kingdom Highly transparent 81 8.129 
1 GRETI is a five-point scale (from ‘High transparency’ to ‘Opaque’) which quantifies the 
transparency of a country’s real estate market. Countries listed with ‘High transparency’ and 
‘Transparent’ in 2016 can be characterised by strong regulation, governance and transaction 
processes, with technology driving advancement and/or beneficial ownership disclosure in 
the spotlight. www.jll.com/GRETI  
 
2 The Corruption Perception Index provides an annual score that reflects the how corrupt the 
public sector of an individual country is perceived to be (100 is ‘very clean’ and 0 is ‘highly 
corrupt’). https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016  
 
3 The IPRI scores the underlining institutions of a strong property rights regime: the legal and 
political environment, physical property rights, and intellectual property rights. 
https://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/  
 
* Cyprus and Iceland were not listed on the GRETI. They remained on the longlist as they 
satisfied the other criteria and it was noted that Cyprus has a similar legal system to 
Scotland and Iceland has a lot of common land. 
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ANNEX 2: CONTACTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES   
The following table acknowledges the input of individuals in other countries in confirming the 
accuracy of the desk-based review and answering additional questions by phone, Skype or 
email about the motivations and impacts associated with interventions in different places. 
Table 11: Contacts in other countries 
Country Name Affiliation 
Australia Tina Hunter School of Law, University of Aberdeen 
Kate Galloway Faculty of Law, Bond University 
Piyush Tiwari Property Group, Unviersity of Melbourne 
Austria Sophie Marie Schmidt Institute of Law, BOKU 
 Gerhard Weiß Institute of Forest, Environmental and Natural 
Resource Policy, BOKU 
Belgium Simon-Pierre Dumont Propriétaires Ruraux de Wallonie (NTF) 
Canada Wayne Caldwell School of Environmental Design and Rural 
Development, University of Guelph 
 Vic Adamowicz Faculty of Agricultural, Life and Environmental 
Sciences, University of Alberta 
 Wendy Aupers Alberta Environment and Parks, Government 
of Alberta 
Cyprus Demetris Demetriou Land Consolidation Department, Cyprus/ 
University of Leeds 
Czech Republic Petr Sklenička Faculty of Environmental Sciences, Czech 
University of Life Sciences Prague  
Denmark Helle Tegner Anker Department of Food and Resource 
Economics, University of Copenhagen 
 Jakob Vesterlund Olsen Department of Food and Resource 
Economics, University of Copenhagen 
Finland Kirsikka Riekkinen Department of Built Environment, Aalto 
University 
 Arvo Vitikainen Aalto University 
 Ilari Hovila University of Lapland 
France André Torre French National Institute for Agricultural 
Research 
Germany Alfons Balmann Department of Structural Development of 
Farms and Rural Areas, Leibniz Institute of 
Agricultural Development in Transition 
Economies 
 Martin Werneburg Linden Partners, Berlin 
Iceland Grétar Þór Eyþórsson University of Akureyri 
Netherlands Thomas van Oosten Over Morgen Consultancy/Faculty of 
Geosciences, Utrecht University 
New Zealand Graham Squires Property Group, Massey University 
 Mick Strack School of Surveying, University of Otago 
Norway Tor Arnesen Eastern Norway Research Institute 
 Erik Neslein Mønness Inland Norway University 
 Erlend Nybakk Kristiania University College 
 Magnar Forbord Ruralis Institut 
Poland Dominika Milczarek-
Andrzejewska 
Institute of Rural and Agricultural 
Development, Polish Academy of Sciences 
 Jan Fałkowski University of Warsaw 
 Jerzy Bański Institute of Geography, Polish Academy of 
Sciences 
Portugal Diana Feliciano School of Biological Sciences, University of 
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Country Name Affiliation 
Aberdeen 
Slovakia Anna Bandlerová Faculty of European Studies and Regional 
Development, Slovak University of Agriculture 
 Jarmila Laziková Department of Law, Slovak University of 
Agriculture 
Spain Andres Miguel Cosialls 
Ubach 
Centro Universitario de la Defensa de 
Zaragoza 
 Dionisio Ortiz Miranda Rural and Agri-environmental Economy 
Faculty, Universidad Politecnica de Valencia 
 José Mª García 
Álvarez-Coque 
Research Group on International Economics, 
Universidad Politecnica de Valencia 
Sweden David Fridh Lantmäteriet (Swedish Mapping, Cadaster 
and Land Registration 
 Authority) 
 Mats Snäll Lantmäteriet (Swedish Mapping, Cadaster 
and Land Registration Authority) 
 Ewa Rabinowicz AgriFood Economics Centre, Lund University 
 Mark Brady AgriFood Economics Centre, Lund University 
Switzerland Thomas Egger Schweizerische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die 
Berggebiete (Swiss Working Group for 
Mountain Areas)  
 Irmi Seidl Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and 
Landscape Research 
USA John Lovett College of Law, Loyola University New 
Orleans 
 
The research team is also grateful for input from: 
 
Andrea Pődör, Óbuda University 
Andrew Newby, Department of Built Environment, Aalto University 
Annie Tindley, School of History, Classics and Archaeology, Newcastle University 
Biró Szabolcs, Research Institute of Agricultural Economics, Hungary 
Jason Loughrey and Kevin Hanrahan, Teagasc (Agriculture and Food Development 
Authority, Ireland) 
Michael Maunsell, Mountain Research Ireland 
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ANNEX 3: LAND REGISTRATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF 
PROPERTY IN LONGLIST COUNTRIES 
Table 12 focusses on land registration and constitutional and human rights concerns that 
operate as a limiting force towards reallocation of ownership. It makes no reference to 
devices that might be used to drive reform forward. That is not to say such devices are not 
important. Rather, it is to acknowledge that the Scottish devolution settlement is framed in a 
way that legislative competence is expressly constrained by the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) (amongst other things) and it is these concerns that are accordingly 
in the foreground when modelling any future reforms for Scotland. 
Table 12: Land registration system and constitutional protection of property in the longlist 
countries 
Country Robust 
land 
registration 
system? 
Constitutional 
protection of 
property?  
Comments 
Australia Reform in 
process 
Y Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution allows acquisition on just 
terms. Note also that there are native title rules. 
 
Austria Y Y A1P1 ECHR (subject to a reservation relating to a 1955 treaty) 
and Article 5 of the Basic Law (property is inviolable). 
 
Belgium Y Y A1P1 ECHR and Article 16 of the Constitution (no deprivation 
save for public purpose, in accordance with law and with 
compensation). 
 
Canada N N Limited constitutional protection, but the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms has some relevant provisions against 
intrusion by the State (although property is not directly 
mentioned) and the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 provides 
for no deprivation except in accordance with law. Also relevant 
is the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
of 1948, albeit this is not directly implemented into Canadian 
law. 
 
Cyprus Y Y A1P1 ECHR and Article 23 of the Constitution (only deprivation 
or limitation in accordance with this article, in terms of 23(3) 
including public safety, health, morals, planning and 
development etc., in accordance with clear law and with 
compensation. Some compulsory powers also for education, 
religious and other reasons, and also (in terms of 23(6)) in the 
event of an agricultural reform lands only to be redistributed to 
people from the same community as the owner from whom 
land has been compulsorily acquired. 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
Y Y A1P1 ECHR. 
 
Denmark Y Y A1P1 ECHR. Also Basic Law (Constitution) article 73, property 
is inviolable (save when in public interest to deprive, with 
compensation).  Laws relating to expropriation subject to 
special parliamentary procedure.  
 
Finland Y Y A1P1 ECHR and Section 15 of the Constitution (property 
protected, deprivation needs to be for public needs, with 
compensation in accordance with law). 
 
France Y Y A1P1 ECHR and property has a certain sentimental status 
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Country Robust 
land 
registration 
system? 
Constitutional 
protection of 
property?  
Comments 
amongst French Constitution - see Articles 2 and 17 of the 
Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 1789 (natural and 
imprescriptible rights/no deprivation unless public necessity, 
legal, obviously required, and just and prior indemnity). 
 
Germany Y Y A1P1 ECHR and Basic Law (Constitution/Grungesetz) Articles 
14 and 15. 14(1) Property guaranteed. 14(2) Property entails 
obligations and use will serve the public good. 14(3) 
Expropriation only permissible for public good, pursuant to law 
and with compensation. 15 Land, natural resources and means 
of production may be transferred to public ownership with 
compensation. 
 
Iceland Y Y A1P1 ECHR and Article 72 of the Constitution (property 
inviolate, unless in the public interest as provided for by law 
with compensation) AND the right of foreigners to own real 
property interests or businesses in Iceland may be limited by 
law. 
 
New 
Zealand 
Y N Like Canada (excluding Quebec), a limited amount of 
constitutional protection within a common law system. 
Attempts to introduce formal protection into the Bill of Rights 
failed in the 2000s. Indigenous title issues are also at play in 
relation to Maori communities. 
 
Norway Y Y 
 
A1P1 ECHR and Article 105 (any surrender of property must 
receive full compensation) 
 
Poland N Y A1P1 ECHR and Article 46 of the Constitution (deprivation only 
with a statute and court order) and 64 (everyone can own 
property, restrictions can only be by law to the extent it does 
not violate substance of right). 
 
Portugal N Y A1P1 ECHR and Article 62 (no deprivation except in 
accordance with law and with compensation). 
 
Singapore Y N Property not expressly included amongst fundamental liberties 
in article 9 (liberty of the person) of the Constitution, although 
discrimination rules are not to operate in a manner that affects 
property (article 12). Private ownership of residential property 
is separately restricted. 
 
Slovakia Y Y A1P1 ECHR and Article 20 of the Constitution (expropriation in 
accordance with law, for the public interest and with 
compensation). 
 
Spain N Y A1P1 ECHR and Article 33 (no deprivation except on 
recognised grounds, in accordance with the law and with 
compensation). See also Article 47 regarding housing and land 
use regulation to prevent speculation 
 
Sweden Y Y A1P1 ECHR and Article 15 of the Riksdagen (Protection of 
property and right of public access), property is guaranteed 
save when expropriation is accompanied by proper 
compensation. 
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Country Robust 
land 
registration 
system? 
Constitutional 
protection of 
property?  
Comments 
Switzerland Y Y Article 26 of Constitution: deprivation or controls equivalent to 
that shall be compensated in full. 
 
USA N Y 5th Amendment of the Constitution, private property not to be 
taken for public use without compensation (the "takings 
clause"). "Eminent domain" allows for compulsory purchase 
but this is highly regulated. 
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ANNEX 4: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC REFERENCE LIST 
Selected academic references and published reports are provided for countries on the 
longlist. These sources were used in the desk-based review and/or referred to in the detailed 
consideration of shortlisted case studies. The reference list does not include general web 
articles; cross-checking information with country experts confirmed accuracy of data 
gathered in this way. 
 
Australia 
Altmann, E. 2017. Foreign ownership of housing – how do Australia and New Zealand 
compare? The Conversation. 
Australian Government. 2017. Register of Foreign Ownership of Agricultural Land. Report of 
registrations as at 30 June 2017. 
Christensen, S., Connor, P.O., Duncan, W. & Ashcroft, R. 2008. Early land grants and 
reservations: any lessons from the Queensland experience for the sustainability 
challenge to land ownership. James Cook University Law Review, 42. 
Foreign Investment Review Board. 2017. Annual Report 2015-2016. Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
Murphy, L. 2011. The global financial crisis and the Australian and New Zealand housing 
markets. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 26, 335-351. 
 
Austria 
Möhrs, K., Forster, F., Kumnig, S. & Rauth, L. 2013. The politics of land and food in cities in 
the North: reclaiming urban agriculture and the struggle Solidarisch Landwirtschaften! 
(SoliLa!) in Austria. In: Franco, J. & Borras Jr. (eds.) 2013. Land concentration, land 
grabbing and people’s struggles in Europe. Transnational Institute, Netherlands, pp. 82-
113. 
Weiss, G., Aggestam, F., Hogl, K., Jandl, R., Živojinović, I., Ludvig, A. & Wolfslehner, B. 
2015. Austria. In: Živojinović, I., Weiss, G., Lidestav, G., Feliciano, D., Hujala, T., 
Dobšinská, Z., Lawrence, A., Nybakk, E., Quiroga, S. & Schraml, U. (eds.) Forest Land 
Ownership Change in Europe. COST Action FP1201 FACESMAP Country Reports. 
 
Belgium 
Ciaian, P., d’Artis, K., Swinnen, J., Van Herck, K. & Vranken, L. 2012. Rental Market 
Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Centre 
for European Policy Studies Working Paper, Brussels. 
Rondeaux, J., Colson, V., Farcy, C. and Marchal, D. (2015). Belgium. In: Živojinović, I., 
Weiss, G., Lidestav, G., Feliciano, D., Hujala, T., Dobšinská, Z., Lawrence, A., Nybakk, 
E., Quiroga, S. & Schraml, U. (eds.) Forest Land Ownership Change in Europe. COST 
Action FP1201 FACESMAP Country Reports. 
 
Canada 
Ferguson, S., Furtan, H. & Carlberg, J. 2006. The political economy of farmland ownership 
regulations and land prices. Agricultural Economics, 35, 59-65. 
Gray, R., Fulton, M. & Furtan, H. 2007. The Provision of Goods and Farm Policy in Canada. 
Report, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan. 
 
Cyprus 
Demetriou, D., Stillwell, J. & See, L. 2012. Land consolidation in Cyprus: Why is an 
Integrated Planning and Decision Support System required? Land Use Policy, 29, 131-
142. 
Neocleous, A. & Co. 2016. Real Estate and Property in Cyprus.  
Czech Republic 
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Sklenicka, P., Janovska, V., Salek, M. Vlasak, J. & Molnarova, K. 2014. The Farmland 
Rental Paradox: Extreme land ownership fragmentation as a new form of land 
degradation. Land Use Policy, 38, 587-593. 
Sklenicka, P., Zouhar, J., Trpáková, I. & Vlasák, J. 2017. Trends in land ownership 
fragmentation during the last 230 years in Czechia, and a projection of future 
developments. Land Use Policy, 67, 640-651. 
 
Denmark 
Haldrup, N.O. 2015. Agreement based land consolidation – in perspective of  new modes of 
governance. Land Use Policy, 46, 163-177. 
Hartvigsen, M. 2014. Land consolidation and land banking in Denmark – tradition, multi-
purpose and perspectives. Danish Journal of Geoinformatics and Land Management, 47, 
1-7. 
 
Finland 
Ministry of Defence 2017. Summary of the report, dated 20 April 2017, on improving 
comprehensive state security in transfers of immovable property. 
 
France 
Melot, R. 2018. Pre-emption rights in France: Disputes over pre-emptions and the ‘land 
scarcity’. In: Gerber, J.-D., Hartmann, T. and Hengstermann, A. (eds.) Instruments of 
Land Policy: Dealing with Scarcity of Land. Taylor and Francis, pp. 199-212. 
 
Germany 
Gregor, P. 2015. Agricultural law in Germany: overview. Thomson Reuters Practical Law.  
Herre, R. 2013. Land concentration, land grabbing and options for change in Germany. In: 
Franco, J. & Borras Jr., S.M. (eds.) Land concentration, land grabbing and people’s 
struggles in Europe. Transnational Institute (TNI) for European Coordination Via 
Campesina and Hands off the Land network. 
Koch, M. & Maier, C. 2015. Germany. In: Živojinović, I., Weiss, G., Lidestav, G., Feliciano, 
D., Hujala, T., Dobšinská, Z., Lawrence, A., Nybakk, E., Quiroga, S. & Schraml, U. (eds.) 
Forest Land Ownership Change in Europe. COST Action FP1201 FACESMAP Country 
Reports. 
Zimmer, Y. 2014. Leasing and purchasing arable land - legal rules, profitability and investor’s 
view. Agri Benchmark, Working Paper 2014/6. 
 
Netherlands 
van Oosten, T., Witte, P. & Hartmann, T. in press. Active land policy in small municipalities in 
the Netherlands: “We don’t do it, unless…” Land Use Policy. 
 
New Zealand 
Altmann, E. 2017. Foreign ownership of housing – how do Australia and New Zealand 
compare? The Conversation. 
Murphy, L. 2011. The global financial crisis and the Australian and New Zealand housing 
markets. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 26, 335-351. 
 
Norway 
Flemsæter, F. & Setten, G. 2009. Holding property in trust: kinship, law, and property 
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ANNEX 5: LAND MARKET INTERVENTIONS TYPOLOGY DATA TABLE 
Table 13 shows how countries were assigned to categories. Cells shaded in grey denote the 
dominant interventions in each country to explain categorisation. Where interventions spread 
across categories, the dominant motivations were examined. For example, Cyprus 
implements two interventions in each of the foreign interest limiter and land consolidator 
categories. While there is some control of foreign investment in Cyprus, investment is 
generally encouraged and limits are to ensure appropriate levels of investment rather than to 
restrict it. More emphasis is placed on the importance of consolidation measures in this 
country. Therefore, Cyprus was placed in the land consolidator category.  
Table 13: Longlist countries organised according to typology of current land market 
interventions 
 
Foreign interest limiters Land use stipulators Land consolidators 
 
AMAX 
(FOR
42
) 
APP 
(FOR) 
FOR USE APP 
(GEN
43
) 
AMAX 
(GEN) 
PRE 
(PUB) 
PRE 
(IND) 
AMIN CON 
Foreign interest limiters 
Australia  X X        
Canada
44
 X X         
New Zealand  X X        
Singapore X X         
Iceland  X X X X      
Denmark  X X       X 
Switzerland  X X X X   X   
USA
45
 X  X        
Land use stipulators 
Finland
46
  X X    X    
Austria  X  X     X  
Sweden    X X      
Germany     X   X   
Poland   X X  X X X  X 
Netherlands       X    
France       X    
Norway    X X   X   
Land consolidators 
Slovakia    X    X X  
Portugal        X   
Belgium        X   
Czech 
Republic 
    X     X 
Spain  X      X X  
Cyprus X X       X X 
Intervention codes:  
AMAX: Restrictions relating to the maximum area of land in a single ownership  
AMIN: Restrictions relating to the minimum area of land in a single ownership 
APP:  Requirements for central, regional or local government to approve ownership 
CON: Scheme(s) to consolidate fragmented landholdings 
FOR: Restrictions relating to land purchase by foreign citizens/companies/governments 
PRE: Pre-emptive rights to buy land by a public actor (PUB) or by individuals (IND) 
USE: Restrictions related to the use of land (e.g. residence, education, age, active farming etc.) 
 
  
                                               
42
 Applies to foreign interests only. 
43
 Applies generally. 
44
 These interventions apply in one or more of: Alberta, Manitoba, Québec, Prince Edward Island and 
Saskatchewan. 
45
 In some states (see Section 3.1.1) 
46
 Note that APP (FOR) and FOR interventions apply to Åland Islands and not Finnish mainland. 
